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ABSTRACT
As China's participation in the global economy continues to expand, its increasing
reliance on imported resources and overseas trade has exerted pressure on China to safeguard its
growing maritime economic and political interests. Although Chinese national interests are well
understood, there is no clear consensus regarding the long-term orientation or intended goals of
China's modernizing military. By examining how sea power theory, maritime interests,
economic and political constraints, and military/naval doctrine may influence China's naval force
structure and maritime strategy, the author seeks to answer whether it is possible to deduce the
most probable future roles of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). This paper suggest
the answer is yes and identifies three force structure and maritime strategy models that the PLAN
may utilize to support China's expanding global and maritime interests.
The author posits that the PLAN will continue to make quantitative and qualitative
improvements, but due primarily to fiscal and technological constraints, China will not directly
challenge the United States by matching its extensive multiple mission naval force structure. The
PLAN is still in a nascent stage of development and already has many of the pieces in place to
proceed toward each model presented, but China must make choices that require it to develop the
PLAN in conjunction with specific and elaborated maritime strategies or risk being a "jack-of-all-
trades and a master of none." The PLAN will therefore develop either as 1) a "Unification"
Navy, maximizing coercive pressure on Taiwan by focusing on regional anti-access strategies; 2)
an "Influence Projection" Navy, capable of a wide range of operations, but not with a capability
nearing a U.S. carrier strike group; or 3) a "Global/Hemispheric Sea Denial" Navy, designed
around a fleet of ultra-quiet nuclear attack submarines, designed to deter a major naval power
from dominating China's vital sea lines of communication. Although there is considerable
variation in opinion and analysis as to the exact direction of China's grand strategy, the author
identifies these models as the most logical force structure and maritime strategies that China
might pursue in support of its maritime interests.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. SCOPE
As China's participation in the global economy continues to expand, an
increasing reliance on external resources and overseas trade has exerted a natural pressure
on China to broaden its worldwide influence in an effort to safeguard its growing
economic and political interests. Traditionally the smallest and least funded branch of the
People's Liberation Army (PLA), the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has seen
significant increases in overall budget authority within the Chinese defense establishment
over the past 15 years. An influx of money and influence has translated into a widely
reported naval procurement and development program, resulting in substantial
improvements in quality and numbers within the PLAN's overall force structure.
Nevertheless, China's ultimate goals for and potential use of an expanded and
more capable PLAN remain unclear. A very broad program, seemingly intended to
improve every element of the Chinese navy, characterizes PLAN modernization. There
seems to be no clear rationale for the PLAN's development, other than increasing
coercive pressure on Taiwan. Chinese naval observers openly discuss acquisition of a
myriad of advanced weapon systems such as aircraft carriers, nuclear missile submarines
(SSBNs), nuclear attack submarines (SSNs), conventional submarines, amphibious
forces, naval aviation, and missile forces with a very limited acknowledgement of a
realistic and coherent maritime strategy. Is it possible to provide that context and deduce
the most probable future roles and force structure of the PLAN from China's political-
military-economic interests, its fiscal and technological constraints, and its elaborated
military and naval doctrine? This paper suggest the answer is yes and identifies the three
most probable force structures and maritime strategies that the PLAN may attempt to
defend its expanding global and maritime interests.
Many nations, including the U.S., carefully conceive and elaborate national
security strategies to inform resource allocation and military force structure decisions.
These decisions, in turn, generally point to possible uses of military force and the
intentions of governments with respect to those forces (Williams 2001, 2). China is
different. Although the PRC has released several defense white papers over the last
decade, these somewhat obtuse documents provide less transparency than many
observers would like to assist in interpreting actual Chinese military intentions (People's
Republic of China State Council Information Office 2006; hereafter CND 2006).' As a
result, there is no clear consensus regarding the long-term orientation or intended targets
of China's modernizing military, but China's national interests are well understood.
Although the PLAN is still in a nascent stage of development, it already has many of the
pieces in place and this paper suggest that the PLAN will most probably develop
according to one of the following three force structure models:
Model I, The "Unification" Navy: The baseline model. At a minimum, the PLAN will
continue to work towards the capabilities noted in this model. This model refers to a
PLAN with a regional focus and structured primarily to support increased coercive
effectiveness against Taiwan. This navy would provide a measure sea control within the
operational sphere of any coercive effort against Taiwan, but would most importantly
For an official U.S. evaluation on the most recent PRC white paper see, U.S. Department of Defense,
Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic ofChina, 2007, 13-14; hereafter CMP
2007.
provide a regional anti-access/sea denial capability to increase the probable costs of
intervention by any outside powers to an unacceptable level. 2
Model II, The "Influence Projection" Navy: A PLAN capable of "showing the flag"
and assuming an increasingly visible presence outside of China's marginal seas. This
navy can be described as a "prestige" navy, with effective but limited power projection
capabilities to protect and promote Chinese interests away from home waters.
Model III, The "Global Sea Denial" Navy: A PLAN that seeks to directly counter any
threat to China's maritime interests by developing capabilities which could deter global
powers (i.e. the U.S.) from controlling or dominating China's critical SLOCs, whether
they lie from the Suez Canal to the Pacific. This navy would not necessarily provide sea
control to China, but deny sea control to a potential adversary.
The ultimate role and force structure of the PLAN holds significant implications
for not only the United States, but for nations and alliances throughout the Asia-Pacific
regions and Indian Ocean. A PLAN capable of effective coercive action against Taiwan
might not attempt to project itself much beyond China's marginal seas, but a regional sea
denial force may prove a formidable challenge for a United States Navy (USN) assigned
to prevent a successful military coercive effort against Taiwan. On the other hand, a
PLAN intent on establishing an "Influence Projection" navy with a modest force
projection capability, even if it includes aircraft carriers, may increase its radius of action
to a near global scale, provide a force capable of directly influencing events ashore, and
provide a credible foil to other moderate naval powers, but would probably not challenge
the world's only major naval power for control of the seas. A Chinese global sea denial
2 Regardless of the model eventually adopted by the PLAN, development of a strong coercive force against
Taiwan will continue to be a priority for the PLAN. In accordance with this assumption, Model I is
considered the baseline model from which the other two models may develop.
force consisting of a large, advanced nuclear submarine force capable of patrolling all of
China's critical sea lines of communication (SLOCs) provides perhaps the most
significant long-term challenge to the United States. This PLAN would directly
challenge the United States' traditional free access to the world's oceans, altering many
American assumptions of global access, but this force would have difficulty directly
affecting events ashore. Most importantly, the models each represent a differing focus for
future Chinese maritime strategy and may serve as indicators of Chinese intentions for
the region, for the direction or potential targets of its military, and for its foreign policy in
general.
B. METHODOLOGY
In developing the potential force structure models, I examine how sea power
theory, maritime interests, economic and political limitations, and military/naval doctrine
tend to influence China's naval force structure. Although there is considerable variation
in opinion and analysis as to the exact direction of China's grand strategy, one can
certainly identify China's maritime interests, the limitations facing development of the
PLAN, and the PLAN's elaborated doctrine/principles, and then discern the most logical
force structures and maritime strategies that China might pursue. This is the process I
have utilized in developing the three future models of the PLAN.
1. Assumptions
The models suggested in this paper are developed within the framework of three
primary assumptions:
i) In the absence of a national emergency, the PRC is constrained in the
amount of money it can spend on the PLA. Domestic spending priorities constrain
defense spending, and the risk of an expensive international arms race with the either the
United States or Japan restrains any massive defense build-up;
ii) The PRC does not yet have a military industrial complex
technologically competent or competitive enough to develop the types of weapon systems
(i.e. stealth aircraft, super-carriers, and integrated battle group command and control
systems) that can enable direct force on force competition with the United States;
iii) Unification with Taiwan is the pre-eminent political and military
concern for Chinese security planners.
These assumptions are important because they eliminate a fourth potential force structure
model: a global sea control PLAN. If the PLAN does not have the resources to attempt to
"recreate" the U.S. Navy, it will not directly challenge its global maritime dominance by
matching U.S. force structure. Also, increasing Beijing's coercive options with respect to
Taiwan is a baseline capability for any emergent PLAN force structure (CND 2006). 3
The political dynamics requiring the maintenance of a navy capable of coercing Taiwan
and China's economic and technological constraints and restraints to large naval
expenditures will be explained in later sections of this paper
2. Framework
Ideally, a nation's military force structure develops from a well thought
out and elaborated national security strategy, but the strategy-force structure question can
often resemble the proverbial chicken or the egg where force structure drives the
3 "The struggle to oppose and contain the separatist forces for 'Taiwan independence' and their activities"
remains the key element of China's foreign and domestic policies.
capabilities that drive strategy. Recognizing that force structure (and the capabilities that
force structure enables) can determine the limits of strategy, one can posit how the
different naval force structures presented in this paper can provide insight into Chinese
foreign policy objectives. Although this particular case study might eventually lend itself
to further hypothesis testing on how nations develop various military force structures, this
paper seeks to capture the particular relationship that may exist between theory, interests,
and constraints and how they might combine to develop specific future force structure
models for the PLAN.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
The first section of this paper discusses the development of sea power theory, its
importance to developing maritime powers, and the influence of western sea power
theorists on Chinese naval thought. The second section identifies China's expanding
vital maritime interests, the risk to those interests, and some examples of how China is
seeking to mitigate those risks. The third section provides insight into the political,
economic, and technological limitations to modernizing and expanding the PLAN. The
fourth section provides a brief history of Chinese doctrinal development and current
PLAN maritime principles. The fifth section describes the three potential naval force
structure models, how they might contribute to Chinese interests, and discusses whether
or not China is on the right path to developing its capabilities in accordance with those
potential force structure decisions. In closing for each model, I draw some initial
conclusions from this analysis in order to assess implications of those models for China
with respect to its potential competitors.
D. BACKGROUND
1. China as an Emerging Maritime Power
Historically, as nations' interests have expanded beyond their borders, their
interests have placed additional pressure on them to expand the capabilities and reach of
their militaries. For nations reliant upon the sea for territorial defense and for access to
resources and markets, navies have often assumed great importance. Despite
considerable, albeit episodic, maritime accomplishments, China has historically looked
inward, cultivating a decisively continental, not maritime, self-image (Cole 2001).4 After
a centuries long lapse in sea power development, China has developed considerable
economic and political interests in the sea and now seems poised to re-emerge as a
maritime nation. Concern over burgeoning overseas trade, reliance on imported
resources, interests in international law which affects territorial disputes in the South
China Sea, a growing domestic ship production capability and increasing maritime
infrastructure all point toward China re-creating itself as a maritime nation. Since the end
4 From 500 B.C. until the sixteenth century, various Chinese dynasties and regimes maintained expansive
and technologically advanced maritime fleets. The most exceptional and intrepid of the Chinese sailing
admirals was Zheng He. Considered by many as the "most towering maritime figure in the 4,000 year
annals of China," for a brief period of time during the Ming Dynasty, he commanded vast fleets of naval
and merchant vessels which undertook four major voyages as far west as Africa and the Middle East. His
voyages throughout the Indian Ocean in 400-ton vessels during the early fifteenth century set a worldwide
standard for navigation and clearly surpassed contemporary European efforts.
Nevertheless, threatened by the increasing influence of eunuchs like Zheng He, the Ming ended
the Chinese experiment abruptly. Feeling pressure from internal intrigues, external aggression, and the
immense drain on the treasury created by large fleets, the Ming consciously ended their maritime
commitments by ultimately ordering the destruction of their ships. To Chinese reasoning, this action
served to eliminate the expense of maintaining a large fleet, sealed off the mainland from corrupting
external influences, and centered Chinese efforts on national interests and opportunities and threats that lay
to the north and west (inland), not to the East and South (seaward). By this action, the Ming removed
China from the forefront of seafaring nations and re-focused the Chinese away from the maritime world.
Between the self-imposed destruction of the Chinese fleet under the Ming dynasty until the twentieth
century, China's military and economic efforts have generally looked inward and toward threats from the
Asian landmass. China is still recovering from this action.
of the Cold War, no acquisition of naval power has produced as much interest, concern,
and alarm among U.S. security professionals as that of the People's Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN). The U.S. Department of Defense believes that "of the major and
emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United
States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional
U.S. military advantages absent U.S. counter strategies" (U.S. Department of Defense
2006, 29; hereafter QDR 2006). China's acquisition of a modern, capable, and
(presumably) expansive navy, therefore, remains its most prominent manifestation of
desire to establish itself as a maritime nation.
2. Coercing Taiwan: The PLAN's Growing Importance
Congruous with the concerns of the U.S. Defense Department, most observers of
the People's Republic of China (PRC) acknowledge that the relatively rapid
modernization and expansion of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) is at least a clear
indicator of China's desire to maintain a credible coercive lever with respect to Taiwan
(QDR 2006, 29; People's Republic of China, State Council Information Office 2004;
hereafter CND 2004). 5 The cross-strait military balance dominates Asia-Pacific security
literature, but increases in the PLA's overall budget, an ever-increasing share of that
budget for the PLAN, and the growing prominence of the PLAN within the PLA and
CMC, may point toward a fundamental shift towards a more expansive and ambitious
maritime strategy for the Chinese defense establishment.
The PRC has made significant capital investments in the PLAN and has
prioritized its development by making the navy a pillar of the PLA's "three
5 Both U.S. and Chinese sources cite the PRC's rapid military build-up as a response to increasing military
options with respect to Taiwan.
modernizations." Outside of the Central Military Committee (CMC) however, China's
ultimate vision for the PLAN is only partially understood (CND 2004).6 The intent and
extent of the Chinese naval build-up has various important implications for the U.S. and
other nations as they struggle to assess on going military force structure and alignment
requirements in Asia, which leads one to ask: what will the PLAN ultimately look like?
In seeking the answer to the previous question one may next ask: what is the ultimate role
of a more capable and larger Chinese navy? The answer to the first question depends
greatly on the answer to the second. This paper seeks to provide answers to both by
providing three potential force structure models for the PLAN and the implications of
each for Chinese, U.S. and regional security affairs.
3. Beyond Taiwan: Increasing Chinese Maritime Interests
The PLAN finds itself at the forefront of Chinese efforts to defend and expand a
new set of vital Chinese interests. The increasing capabilities of naval weapon platforms,
renewed naval doctrine and maritime strategy development, and the broadening role for
the PLAN within the Chinese security apparatus suggest that China might be looking past
the PLAN's primary maritime role of containing and coercing Taiwan to establish a naval
presence further a-field. Expanding capabilities and operating areas are natural by-
products of the modernization effort currently underway in the PLAN. Increased
capabilities with respect to Taiwan, invariably increases the PLAN's radius of action. As
its radius of action expands, the PLAN's ability to promote and protect other vital
Chinese maritime interests similarly increases, solidifying control and legitimacy in
6 Even the U.S. DoD admits that "the outside world has little knowledge of Chinese motivations and
decision-making or of key capabilities supporting its military modernization" (QDR 2006, 29).
existing regions of Chinese influence and providing opportunities to expand Chinese
influence beyond traditional areas.
a) Defense of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and Territorial
Claims
Since the demise of the Soviet Union, only the United States has had the
naval power to both credibly defend the Asian SLOCs and (more threatening to the
nations reliant upon those SLOCs) to deny access to them. A large, forward U.S. naval
presence in Asia has historically provided a stabilizing element to maritime interests by
deterring nations that might consider disrupting Asian SLOCs. This may be changing.
Buoyed by increased wealth due to globalization, and determined to ensure vital
international trade and resources, maritime power and the ability to project that power
with credible naval forces has gained renewed significance to the nations of Asia. With a
multitude of competing territorial and resource claims, potential flashpoints in the Asia-
Pacific region abound. Territorial disputes continue throughout the marginal seas,
straddling the maritime highways of global trade. Control of vital SLOCs, or the ability
to deny access to them, exerts a powerful economic and political pull on nations and their
policies.
Racing to exploit the potential economic value of undersea resources, China
currently challenges the sovereignty of numerous reefs, rocks, and islands in the South
and East China Sea with the Philippines, Malaysia, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan,
Indonesia and Vietnam.7 Direct confrontational encounters between the PRC and other
regional nations could provide the impetus for potential conflict initiation. An attempt to
7 Since the 1974 invasion and partial occupation of the Parcel Islands from Vietnam, China has used
military force to exert its claim on territory in the South China Sea on at least three occasions (Ng 2005,
Appen. 3).
restrict the free flow of resources or trade through the region would provide the most
likely point of friction, but a territorial dispute could also escalate quickly.
b) Challenging the Military Status Quo?
With regard to the PLAN, many policy analyses tend to focus on a
perceived asymmetry in the regional military balance due to Chinese naval procurement,
characterizing increased PLAN capability as a direct challenge to continued U.S., and
even Japanese, maritime dominance.8 Is the Chinese naval build-up a direct challenge
the region's major powers? Whether China intends to challenge the US or Japan, and
whether its current force structure actually constitutes such a challenge are two separate
questions. Both, however, lead China's potential competitors to question the efficacy of
their own force structure with respect to emerging Chinese maritime power.
China's maritime development obviously does not occur in a vacuum and other
regional powers continue to modernize and respond to challenges to their interests.
Japan, for example, has carefully constructed a maritime strategy committing itself to the
independent defense of its SLOCs inside of a 1000nm radius from Tokyo (defense farther
abroad being limited by the pacifist constitution). Formulated during the Cold War,
execution of this maritime strategy forced the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force
(JMSDF) to grow and learn as an institution, a daunting task in the shadow of the Soviet
Union's Pacific fleet. Managing to juggle the constitutional limitations to "overseas"
military presence, significant domestic reticence toward increased defense spending, and
U.S. pressure for a greater Japanese contribution to the U.S.-Japan Strategic Partnership,
Japan has built perhaps the largest and most capable navy in Asia, second only to the
8 For pessimistic assessments on PLAN challenges to U.S. and Japanese maritime power, see (Tkacik 2006;
Fisher 2006; Fisher 2005). For a more optimistic view, see (Ji 2006).
United States Navy. With the disintegration of the Soviet Pacific fleet, the Japanese
maritime strategy now seems eminently plausible and realistic, but Japan's established
maritime strategy may conflict with China's. China will have to consider the interests
and capabilities of regional peers such as Japan as it seeks to modernize and develop the
PLAN.
More than any other branch of the PLA, the strategy and force structure decisions
of the PLAN may provide the most valuable insight into the nature of China's grand
strategy and long-term perception of itself in the region. Analyses such as this can
contribute to a discussion on Asia-Pacific security affairs by understanding real
capabilities as a measure of political intent. A PLAN developed solely as a coercive
component against Taiwan and not capable of long range deployments or power
projection suggests that China would probably not act directly against the interests of
other naval powers in the region, especially if backed up by an American security
guarantee. However, the potential of a PLAN capable of denying access to Asian SLOCs
or territorial seas to peer competitors might suggest the value of further study of China's
perceptions of American involvement not only in a Taiwan scenario, but also in a China-
Japan conflict and the nature of the Japanese-American security relationship. Hopefully,
the analysis and conclusions drawn from this paper will contribute to the discussion on
Chinese naval power and its implications for Asia-Pacific security studies.
II: SEA POWER THEORY9
In order to bring structure to the naval modernization and expansion program,
China will need to adopt a theory of sea power that matches Chinese naval doctrine and
realistically corresponds to established or near-term capabilities. The decisive and
overwhelming U.S. response to several recent crises (e.g. Persian Gulf War, the Balkans,
especially the Kosovo bombing campaign, the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the Afghanistan
War, and the Iraq War) has pushed the PLA and Chinese commentators to look closely at
the lessons learned from these demonstrations of U.S. military power. The lessons
expressed by Chinese examination of recent U.S. military actions reflect both an
introspective look at deficiencies in current Chinese military power and a view of grand
strategy that assumes American attempts to maintain unilateral military supremacy. To
many Chinese observers, the lessons seem clear: in order to counter American hegemonic
intentions throughout the world, but especially in areas vital to Chinese interests, the
PLA, and the PLAN in particular, will need to expand operational capabilities and reach.
A. WHAT IS SEA POWER?
1) Definition
A relatively vast literature focuses on the sources of sea power, the means to its
acquisition, its effects, and its application. However, these discussions often fall short in
9 The study of sea power, its effects, and its application has taken on a renaissance of sorts with the demise
of the cold war and the probable use of nuclear weapons as a war-fighting option. Due to their immensely
destructive capabilities, nuclear weapons precluded the type of sea power interactions that had been seen
prior to their introduction. The demise of both the preeminence of nuclear weapons in future potential
conflicts and the bi-polar relationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. creates an opportunity for a re-
emergence of the traditional dynamic relationships between sea power nations (Friedman 2001, 1).
describing the components of sea power and in prescribing a method to measure it. "The
term sea power is not exclusively synonymous with naval warfare. It is a much broader
concept that entails at least four elements: the control of international trade and
commerce; the usage and control of ocean resources; the operations of navies in war; and
the use of navies and maritime economic power as instruments of diplomacy, deterrence,
and political influence in time of peace" (Tangredi 2002, ch 1). Naval scholars often cite
American Alfred Thayer Mahan's Influence of Sea Power on History and Englishman
Julian Corbett's Some Principles of Maritime Strategy as the nexus of the historical quest
to define sea power and identify its characteristics, and while Mahan might readily agree
with the above definition of sea power. However, Corbett might prefer the following:
"modern sea power can be defined as the combination of a nation-state's capacity for
international maritime commerce and utilization of oceanic resources, with its ability to
project military power into the sea, for the purposes of sea and area control over
commerce and conflict, and from the sea, in order to influence events on land by means
of naval forces" (Tangredi 2002, ch. 1). Despite subtle differences, each definition
captures the nearly universally recognized importance of sea power to nations reliant
upon the maritime domain.
2. Measure
Mahan listed six characteristics that contribute to the measure of a nation's sea
power:
1) Geographic Position
2) Physical conformation (natural resources and environment)
3) Extent of territory
4) Number of population
5) Character of the people
6) Character of the government
"Modern naval historians have updated and reformulated the list, and a recent depiction
includes economic strength, technological prowess, sociopolitical culture (as "first order"
conditions), and geographic position, dependence on maritime trade and sea resources,
and government policy and perception (as "second order" conditions)" (Tangredi 2002,
ch. 1).
One useful measure of sea power sees it as the merging of several input and
output values necessary to create sea power (Till 2004, 4). Inputs to sea power include
the hardware (ships, aircraft, etc.), industry, and infrastructure necessary to apply
influence from the sea. A nation with no ships or the ability to build and maintain them
would be a very weak sea power indeed. Measuring sea power as an output attempts to
capture the ability to "influence the behavior of other people or things by what one does
at or from the sea" (Till 2004, 4). Although a nation may have a strong navy or the
capability to produce one, if it cannot gain positive (from its perspective) effects on or
from the sea, the input value of a strong navy is worthless. Both inputs and outputs,
therefore, become necessary measures of sea power.
Others view sea power through a similar lens, but make further distinctions to
measure the output as either an expression of purely political or military influence. Since
Mahan and Corbett concentrated their efforts primarily on the utility of naval power in
conflict, they left the greater part of the discussion of sea power's political and deterrent
utility to others. For these theorists, sea power has distinctly different characterizations
whether applied in wartime or peacetime. In wartime, sea power's influence becomes
primarily an instrument of military power, attempting to apply direct military dominance
over an adversary.' l In peacetime however, the effects of sea power are often not direct
at all, but are "'political' in the sense that their workings rely on the reactions of others,
and these are reactions that naval deployments may evoke, but cannot directly induce"
(Luttwak 1974, 2).
B. WHY SEA POWER MATTERS
When discussing sea power, many authors point out that the world is covered by
water on over 70 percent of its surface. The world's most productive nations and nearly
80 percent of the world's population lie within 500 nautical miles of the sea. These facts
are never lost on those who aspire to sea power. Alfred Thayer Mahan famously stated
that the importance of sea power derived from the fact that "the first and most obvious
light in which the sea presents itself from a social and political point of view is that of a
great highway; or...a great common over which men may pass in all directions" (Mahan
1918, 16). Transportation via inland waterways, marginal seas, and oceans remains the
most efficient method to transport goods and natural resources to market. With few
exceptions, modem society has increased its reliance upon the sea as a medium for
transportation and resource exploitation.
Historically, successful application of sea power has contributed greatly to a
nation's success in war and wealth in peace.1' The world's oceans provide more than just
a global transportation market for the world's goods and resources. Nations that trade
'0 "Sea power is the ability to use the seas and oceans for military purposes and to preclude an enemy from
doing the same" (Gray 1992, 4).
" For a historical perspective of the success of sea power nations over land power nations, see (Gray 1992).
along the maritime highway may grow rich, but those that can control it, will control their
own destiny. As Norman Friedman (2001, 4) writes, "sea power offers choices that land
power cannot make...the sea can be either a barrier to attack or a highway leading both to
our enemies and to us. Naval power creates the barrier and naval power exploits the
highway, but naval weakness makes the sea an invitation to attack." Effective use and
control of the "great common" would therefore seem critical to a nation's prosperity and
security (Posen 2003).12
C. COMPETING VISIONS OF SEA POWER
Although his influence has often been overemphasized, Mahan's theories on the
effectiveness of sea power helped to fuel a powerful navalist sentiment and several
enormous naval construction programs among nations in the late 19 th and early 2 0 th
centuries. 13 Command of the sea became the goal. 14  Mahan's enthusiasm for the
effectiveness of sea power as a determining factor in the competition among nations lead
many of his readers to deduce that sea power was the determining factor in assuring
national success. 1
12 In his essay "Command of the Commons," Barry Posen discusses how the ability to dominate the global
commons (whether air, space, or water) is the key enabler in worldwide power projection and one of the
primary reasons why the U.S. remains the world's unparalleled military power.
13 Mahan's works truly had a remarkable influence. Kaiser Wilhelm II of German famously remarked, "I
am just now not reading but devouring Captain Mahan's book and am trying to learn it by heart. It is a first
class work and classical in all its points. It is on board all my ships and constantly quoted by my captains
and officers" (Till 1986, 80).
14 Command of the sea in this sense means complete control (freedom of action) over the oceans regardless
of space and time. Later naval scholars morphed command of the sea into the concept of sea control. Sea
control does not necessarily mean complete freedom of action throughout the world's oceans, but does
mean freedom of action within a defined space and for a specific period of time.
15 Some observers note that Mahan made efforts to point out the limits of sea power as "but one factor in
that general advance and decay of nations" and to point out the relationship between "the effects of naval
warfare on the strategic situation ashore" (Till 2004, 42-43).
Corbett delved beyond mere control of the sea and into the roles and advantages
of sea power. He specifically focused on exploring the advantages conferred by sea
power to nations beyond the role of a navy's ability to destroy the enemy's fleet in battle.
To Corbett, sea power confers a degree of flexibility in conflict, enabling those who
command the sea to limit the extent of the conflict. In fact, this idea was not new.
Remarking on the potential of sea power to limit conflict, Francis Bacon wrote, "He that
commandeth the sea is at great liberty and may take as much or as little of the war as he
will" (Friedman 2001, 4). Especially in conflicts where protagonists do not share
contiguous borders or are separated by distance, (restricting the retaliatory capability of
the enemy and the geographical extent of the fighting) sea power enables the side with
command of the sea to limit its liability with respect to the conflict by choosing the
degree to which it engages the opposition (Till 2004, 49).
Another primary debate between sea power theorists has revolved around the
proper roles and efficacy of sea power. The question concerning the role of sea power,
and by derivation, the role of navies, focuses on the whether navies are best used as a tool
to directly challenge and confront other nations' navies or, since man is a terrestrial
creature that lives and conducts his business on land, are they best used as an enabler for
objectives ashore? In other words, can sea power be successful as a stand-alone strategy
or is it best conceived as providing a supporting element to a strategy based on objectives
ashore?
Mahan primarily focused on the effects of sea power in the context of the
competition between nations, specifically during times of conflict or direct economic
competition that could lead to war. 16 In conflict, the question sea power nations must
answer is should sea power focus on the destruction of the enemy's fleet and naval
capability or should sea power provide the enabling element to a nation's land power
component? Mahan clearly felt that sea power (and command of the sea) is best
established by decisively defeating the enemy's fleet and naval infrastructure. By
destroying the enemy's capability to conduct naval operations, a nation can establish
permanent and total command of the sea, eliminating any further challenge to dominance
of the "great common," thus ensuring continued national strength. To Mahan, a strong,
dominant navy, capable of directly confronting the naval strength of an enemy, is
ultimately the best method of protecting the sea lines of communication, hence the
security and prosperity of a maritime nation.
Unfortunately, few nations have the resources to build, maintain, and operate a
navy with the capability to dominate the global commons. In contrast to Mahan, Corbett
argued that destruction of the enemy's fleet is not a requisite for sea control and that sea
control need not even be permanent (in time or place) to contribute to the security of a
maritime nation. Sea power is only useful for "the strategic effect (it) can secure ashore,
where people live" (Gray 1992, 1). Whether one sees sea power as a strategic or
operational tool, most agree that it must contribute to an overall strategy or grand
strategy. Writing after Mahan, Corbett "took an overtly political approach to sea power"
(Till 2004, 47). He "emphasized that strategy needs to be consciously related to foreign
policy... (and that) naval strategy has to be related to land strategy" (Till 2004, 47).
Although, like Mahan, Corbett focused his efforts less on the usefulness of naval power
16 Others, such as Edward Luttwak (1974, 1) have sought to identify the influence of sea power as
"peculiarly useful as an instrument of policy even in the absence of hostilities."
during peacetime, in order to emphasize its utility in providing a balanced strategy in
times of conflict, his belief that sea power could serve as an enabler to events ashore
more easily lends itself to the application of sea power outside of the realm of conflict
and towards the economic competition that exists between nations contesting for limited
resources and markets.
Today, it would seem that only the United States has the capability and resources
to even contemplate an offensive minded approach to naval operations that harkens back
to the Mahanian vision of annihilation of the enemy as a means to command of the sea.
However, some Chinese commentators seem to call for just such an approach, and they
often cite recent examples of U.S. sea control as an impetus for China to expand its naval
influence and power. 17
D. A RECENT U.S. APPLICATION OF SEA POWER'8
Sea power, or command of the sea, provides the ability to respond to crises far
removed from normal areas of operation or interests. Although some have argued that
sea power is not a strategic enabler at all, but merely an operational tool, there is no
doubting the operational flexibility that sea power gives to a commander.19 Maneuver
and mobility are important factors in any campaign, and sea power grants this to the
operational commander. The United States' response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq
17 See, Ni Lexiong. "Sea Power and China's Development." The Liberation Daily. 17 April 2005. Ni uses
a Hobbesian historical context to juxtapose China's current position to the first Sino-Japanese War in
arguing for dramatically increased spending on China's navy and argues that Mahan's vision of sea power
dominance still applies to China.
18 Although this example represents an operationally offensive use of sea power, it provides an example of
a strategically defensive response enabled by sea power.
19 Because the fate of nations ultimately rests with events and decisions occurring on land, some sea power
theorists believe that sea power is merely a military component that can contribute to an overall strategic
plan, but not prove decisive on its own. "...there is no naval strategic warfare...A maritime campaign by a
maritime nation aims at sea control as the means to an end, because strategy prescribes wartime goals and
missions governed by purposes on land." Wayne Hughes, CAPT, U.S. Navy (Till 2004, 49).
in 1990 gives one modem example of the increased response options conferred by
command of the sea. The effect of sea power was threefold on the ultimate campaign,
granting the U.S. the operational flexibility and nimbleness to effectively alter the
strategic balance in the region.
First, the United States provided a timely armed response via carrier battle
groups. Within a few days of the Kuwaiti invasion, the U.S. could provide credible and
coordinated air operations in defense of Saudi Arabia utilizing aircraft based on carriers
at sea. While land based aircraft also deployed to Saudi air bases, their utility was
initially limited by the lag time required to accumulate critical maintenance and support
units. Furthermore, land based tactical aircraft also had to coordinate with Saudi
authorities on permissible operations prior to flying missions. Sea based aircraft had the
advantage of self-contained fuel, ammunition, maintenance support, and command and
control facilities and the freedom to operate without first consulting with host
governments. Second, nearly 90 percent of war materiel for the Gulf War was brought
by sea. Sea power enabled the uninterrupted flow of heavy equipment, ammunition, and
support materiel. Even today, in most cases, the most efficient and quickest way to
transport heavy equipment around the globe is by sea. Third, the sea power component
of the coalition forces provided a valuable operational decoy that fixed significant
numbers of the Iraqi army in place in preparation of a potential allied amphibious
operation. The command of the sea enabled the coalition commanders to use the naval
forces when and if they needed to, but the effect of their mere presence altered the
strategic calculations of the enemy and forced him to weaken his positions elsewhere.
This example effectively illustrates Corbett's view of the effects of sea power to limit
liability in conflict for those who posses it and also its ability to affect the strategic
balance when coordinated with and supportive of an effective land strategy.
E. CHINA'S MARITIME CHALLENGE: DEVELOPING A THEORY OF
SEA POWER
Many Chinese commentators clearly associate the importance of sea power to
China's continued economic welfare and security. These commentators flatly reject the
opposing position that China would ultimately benefit from a cooperative security
arrangement with regional partners. While there is an acknowledgement by these same
commentators that "opinions in China are greatly divided on whether or not, and if so,
how China should strive for sea power," those that argue strongly for an increase in
Chinese sea power trumpet the necessity for self-reliance in ensuring open trade routes,
energy resources, and Chinese sovereignty. 20 "If the security guarantee of China's
lifeline at sea were to rely upon 'international cooperation,' to a large degree, it would
mean our reliance upon the Unites States. We are already checked by the U.S. on the
Taiwan matter, if our lifeline at sea once again falls into the hand of the U.S., we will
give the U.S. another bargaining chip over the issue of Taiwan, which will be extremely
disadvantageous to us" (Ni 2005). This position stems from a strong belief that the U.S.
is fully committed to containing China, and, therefore, China's best position is one of
strength vis-a-vis the United States.
While almost all Chinese security commentators advocate increasing Chinese
military strength overall, there may still be debate as to whether or not sea power is the
20 For commentaries that advocate the strengthening of Chinese sea power in response to increasing
Chinese maritime security interests, see (Zhang 2006; Ni 2005).
proper avenue to achieve Chinese policy objectives and protect specific interests. Some
Chinese security commentators take a much less bellicose view of U.S.-China relations
and steer the discussion away from direct bi-lateral confrontation toward finding effective
means to manage non-traditional security concerns. These moderate voices tend to push
for increased cooperation in security matters between nations, but especially among
Asian nations (Wang 2005). The PLA itself, in the 2004 Defense White Paper, "gives
priority to the building of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force to seek
balanced development of the combat force structure" (CND 2004). The PLA's three
modernization priorities affect the Air Force and Rocket Forces as well as the PLAN.
Although some have pointed out that relative order of the listing in Chinese defense
documents may be significant, the PLAN will have to compete with the PLAAF and the
Second Artillery Force for resources.
In arguing for increased Chinese sea power, some Chinese reasoning has roots in
the theory of Mahan, Corbett and in western political philosophy. To one Chinese sea
power advocate, "it then becomes obvious that the emergence of 'the Hobbesian Era' and
the rise of Mahan's Sea Power Theory in fact share historical inevitability. The
Hobbesian Law and the Mahan Theory are a symbiosis, with logical inner connections"
(Ni 2005). In the "Hobbesian Era," China cannot rely on other nations to provide a
common defense since it expects that all nations will act in their own self-interest. Since
China's interests (energy resources, trade, raw materials) are increasingly tied to the
maritime environment, "only when the Hobbesian Law recedes out of sight will we see
the disappearance of the traditional Sea Power theory. Since today and in a long time in
the future our world is governed by the Hobbesian Law, China should never ignore
historical experience and the traditional Sea Power concepts. It is not only required by
reality and the future for China to build a strong Navy, it is also required by logical
reasoning" (Ni 2005). Another commentator seconds that logic by bluntly stating, "...it
is imperative that China, as a nation, pay attention to its maritime security and the means
to defend its interests through sea power (a critical capability in which China currently
lags behind)" (Zhang 2006, 20). Statements like these seem to argue for a dominant
Chinese navy that can protect Chinese maritime interests against any potential
competitor. In concourse with both Mahan and Corbett's visions, sea power is seen as
both an instrument of status (Mahan) and an enabler of freedom of action (Corbett).
Views such as these may be on the extreme of Chinese thought, but do present an oft
repeated (in western circles) idea of Chinese sea power theory that not only serves as a
mandate for increased Chinese naval capability, but as a an avenue for recognition of
China as a great power.
III: CHINA'S MARITIME INTERESTS
Although China is technically a developing nation, its economic successes have
left it with the financial resources to undertake a modernization and expansion program
for the PLAN. There is little doubt that China has the fiscal capacity to build a modem
fleet capable of full spectrum naval warfare, but at what cost and to what purpose?
Whatever Sea power theory model China decides upon it must answer more specific
questions in order to provide direction to an expanding navy: what are the maritime
interests of China? What is the goal of this new navy? Does it serve China's vital
interests or might it actually serve as a catalyst for further conflict? Can actual
capabilities support the vision? It is not satisfactory to a strategist or policy maker to
merely state that China has maritime interests and wants to expand. One looking to
deduce the future intentions and direction of the PLAN must address these questions as
well. This section seeks to define how emerging Chinese national interests are driving a
resurgence of maritime and naval modernization and expansion. It will then present
some of the constraints and risks facing Chinese maritime security and identify some of
the initiatives the Chinese have undertaken to mitigate those risks.
A. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STABILITY AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH
The CCP perceives stability and economic growth as necessary to ensure the
political legitimacy of the communist party and therefore, its ultimate survival of as
China's governing institution. According to official Chinese dogma, economic growth
cannot continue without social, political, and civil stability, and stability is intrinsically
related to continued economic growth. Although that characterization may be an
oversimplification, it means that the CCP believes that if the government can provide for
the material expectations of the people, the people will not interfere with the business of
government. China's leadership recognizes that a disruption of energy supplies to China
could have disastrous effects to their economy and subsequently to the regime. The
economic and geopolitical realities of its increased dependence on sea-borne commerce
has forced China to re-evaluate its position as a traditional continental power and to
emphasize securing its maritime interests, especially as they relate to energy imports.
The PRC's efforts to increase its naval power and maritime influence stem from
several various complimentary economic and civil-military interests and also perceptions
that it is increasingly constrained by nations intent on containing Chinese economic
growth and political influence. 2 1  In the civil-military realm, Chinese vital maritime
interests are more specific to the PRC, and reflect a Chinese commitment to unify the
"two Chinas" by bringing Taiwan under Beijing's control and the desire to assert Chinese
territorial claims throughout the South China Sea.22  Economically, Chinese vital
maritime interests reflect the nearly universal desire to secure resources and markets for
trade. Although characterized here as political and economic interests, they are not
completely contained by those labels, as the political affects the economic and vice versa.
Because the regime feels that these interests directly contribute to the goals of stability
21 Increasingly, "the U.S. is identified by Chinese analysts as the most important external force impacting
China's maritime security interests, which not only include Taiwan, the East China Sea and South China
Sea, but also China's sea-lane security" (Blair, Chen and Hagt 2006).
22 Among Chinese scholars there is considerable debate about how China should pursue its interests and to
what extent those interests are threatened by outside entities. Although the U.S. is often viewed as a great
concern for the PRC, sometimes characterized as a "dangerous and predatory hegemon" intent on
containing China's inevitable rise, internal Chinese debates often argue the efficacy of an aggressive
Chinese responses to the American hegemonic threat.
and economic growth and, hence regime survival, they assume a vital character. The
increasing amount of financial resources being spent to modernize of the PLA, in general,
and of the PLAN, more specifically, is a clear acknowledgement of the importance that
China places on sea power as a key enabler in securing its economic and political security
and presenting a credible defense of its maritime interests to external challenges.
B. CIVIL-MILITARY INTERESTS: TAIWAN
Taiwan is of central importance to Chinese political interests. The Taiwan issue
spans both the international and domestic arenas, and therefore presents the outside
observer with an incredibly complicated array of competing and overlapping issues
which affect ultimate policy. China's continuing attempts to assert territorial claims
throughout the South and East China Seas also closely connect with the PRC's attempts
to assert sovereignty over Taiwan.23 The PRC views its efforts to expand and modernize
the PLAN as an important and necessary step to increasing the efficacy of any future
coercive efforts with respect to Taiwan and for providing the presence and power
necessary to promote further sovereignty claims in the China Sea.
Any discussion of potential PLA or PLAN force structure must take into account
the importance of the cross strait relationship with Taiwan within the PRC's domestic
and international political considerations. There is no other single issue that has the
potential to incite Chinese passion and nationalism to the extent that the question of
unification does. From the U.S. perspective, Chinese aggressive stance toward Taiwan
23 While there are certainly political aspects to China's territorial claims over disputed islands in the South
China Sea, there is also a large economic significance to those territorial claims especially in the race to
exploit offshore resources. The economic impact of China's South China Sea territorial claims is addressed
later in this section.
stems from China's aim to "coerce Taiwan into abandoning its efforts to redefine the
'one-China' principle and Taiwan's status in international politics" (Suettinger 2003,
246). Beyond the international dimension of the cross-strait tensions, there are also
critical domestic civil-military considerations that western observers often overlook.
Within the governing power structure, China's policies with Taiwan have as much to do
with "justifying requests for continuing increases in PLA budgets, arousing patriotism to
buttress regime legitimacy, and enhancing central authority above regional interests"
(Suettinger 2003, 246).
The overwhelming importance of Taiwan as a factor even in Chinese domestic
political affairs is difficult to overestimate and may prove a central driver in China's push
to acquire maritime power. As discussed by Jing Huang (2005), in order to bolster its
legitimacy among the Chinese population following the student uprising at Tiananmen
Square in 1989, the CCP leadership instituted a "patriotism education campaign." The
retrocession of ceded lands such as Hong Kong and Macao became a focal point to stir
the nationalist fervor of the Chinese youth. Taiwan, as the last ceded parcel to return,
"became the ultimate symbol of incompleteness in China's sovereignty" (Jing 2005, 5).
Therefore, the Chinese right has created Taiwan into a "sine quo non" for China.
The Taiwan issue not only involves China's sovereignty; over the long run, it is
also very relevant to the problem of gaining sea power which will determine the
fate of China's development. If China loses Taiwan, it will subsequently also
lose the Nansha Islands (Spratleys) and perhaps the Diaoyutai (Senkaku) Islands.
Losing these regions implies that China will lack the basic space for ensuring
national political and economic security that will be essential to China's rise as a
great power...if Taiwan and the other islands are not within China's control,
China will not be able to guarantee the border security of commercial centers
such as Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen. (Zhang 2006, 25)
These comments suggest the power of the rhetoric used in internal Chinese domestic
politics, but also points to Taiwan's geo-strategic importance to the PRC. Although
China has a large coastline that allows it access to the China Sea, its access to the open
ocean is completely blocked by the islands surrounding the South China Sea in the South
and the Japanese islands in the North and East. Should the PRC acquire Taiwan, it would
instantly have access to the deep waters of the Pacific, eliminating the strategic choke
points that hinder Chinese naval capabilities.
Taiwan would clearly serve as an important element to a layered Chinese defense
strategy. The hyperbolic passage noted above does address a key inadequacy of older
Chinese strategic thought in light of modern geo-economic realities. Mao espoused a
fundamentally defensive "People's War" doctrine that "stresses(s) numerical strength,
which is thought to compensate for inferior weaponry... [and] mobilizing the civilian
population for a protracted war" in order to mitigate the disadvantages that China faced in
a force on force encounter with the technologically advanced military powers (e.g. the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R.) (Ji 1999, 2-3).24 In a Peoples' War, the Chinese would trade space
for time and try to envelop their enemy is a war of attrition. Unfortunately, China can no
longer afford to offer the sea as an "avenue for invasion" because the wealthiest and most
24 Mao actually conceived of and utilized his Peoples' War doctrine during the Nationalist-Communist
Civil War, and again against the Japanese in World War II. However, the limitations faced by the
Communists in their previous wars carried over to the Cold War and Mao's doctrine remained the guiding
principle in Chinese military thought until only very recently. Yet, even as Chinese military doctrine
begins to progress past Peoples' War, there is still great homage given to Mao's principles. For example,
new doctrines are almost always couched in Maoist terms such as "Peoples' War under modem conditions"
or and its influence has not been fully erased from
productive regions of China are within 500 nm of the sea, and the capture or destruction
of those regions would be disastrous to China. By emphasizing the importance of the
space provided by Taiwan, Zhang lends support to the "forward defense doctrine"
originally proposed under Deng Xiaoping. In forward defense, "instead of allowing the
enemy to move freely into the country, the PLA (would) firmly stick to positional
defense" (Ji 1999, 2-3).25 Similarly, the acquisition of territory in the South China Sea
gives breathing room to the Chinese strategic position, places it favorably forward
enough to control the near SLOCs in its own backyard, and facilitates China's claims to
resource exploitation in its declared Excusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the South
China Sea. China's past use of force to exert its claims should provide an indicator of the
importance that China places on these political interests.26
C. ECONOMIC INTERESTS27
China recognizes that rapid globalization of the world's economy provides a
renewed drive for nations reliant on foreign trade and resources to ensure access to the
world's oceans and waterways in order to provide the resources and products which fuel
economic growth. If, as one Chinese commentator has observed, the "history of
capitalism and its spread globally [has] shown that it is often accompanied by cruel
competition between nation states," then continued Chinese "...access to global trade and
25 Also see (Godwin 2003, 23-56).
26 Although China has resorted to force in the past, some analysts believe that China is vulnerable to
political pressure short of conflict in pursuing their claims (other than Taiwan) in the South China Sea. See
(Cole 2001; Ji 2000).
27 All statistics in this section taken from the U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, Country Analysis Briefs: China Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis; hereafter, EIA 2006.
resources requires sufficient power to defend one's interests in the trade and resource
transportation routes" (Zhang 2006, 20).
Some significant consequences of China's spectacular economic growth include
an increased demand for the energy products that fuel its economic engine coupled with a
simultaneous increased reliance on foreign trade to provide the raw materials for its
economic expansion and the markets for its manufactured goods. Within the past fifteen
years, China has joined the ranks of the world's net energy importers and fully 90 percent
of China's trade is dependent on sea-lane transportation (Zhang 2006, 22; EIA 2006).
The growing use of the sea for shipping energy products and trade has subsequently
caused an increased Chinese reliance on the international maritime transportation
network to provide its access to the world's energy supplies.
For obvious economic reasons, China has a critical stake in ensuring its access to
the global energy supply. Since becoming a net oil importer in 1993, China's thirst for
oil has kept pace with its economic growth. In 2006, the Chinese economy grew at 9.9%
with an accompanying 500,000bbl/d increase in oil consumption. The EIA estimates that
China consumed 7.4 million bbl/d of crude oil in 2006, but domestically produced only
3.8 million bbl/d. Although the Chinese are actively seeking further development of
domestic oil fields, the EIA does not anticipate that further domestic production will be
able to compete with increasing domestic demand. With additional increases in average
daily consumption rates assured, China economic growth is increasingly tied to its ability
to access offshore and foreign oil supplies.
A brief examination of the origins of China's imported oil demonstrates China's
dependence on maritime transportation networks. China imports the majority of its oil
from Angola, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Russia, and Oman. Crude from each of these countries
must travel via the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca in order to reach Chinese
ports. The Atasu, Kazakhstan to Alashankou, Xinjiang pipeline, currently the only
operational transnational oil pipeline to China, provides China with only 200,000 bbl/d.
Although that volume is expected to double by 2010, the amount of crude that China
imports via maritime commerce will maintain an upward trend.
D. CHINA'S GEOGRAPHIC REALITIES
The limited number of shipping routes to China from its major oil suppliers and
China's lack of shared borders along those routes also contribute to Chinese insecurities
concerning its oil supply and access to markets for its trade goods. These geographic
limitations play a critical role in the Chinese calculus emphasizing maritime security,
adding considerable economic and political constraints to China's energy access
problems. The lack of alternative shipping routes to transport crude oil to Chinese
markets is central to understanding China's geographic dilemma with respect to its
maritime security concerns. Furthermore, because China shares no geographic
boundaries along their critical SLOCs, China has a restricted ability to directly influence
security measures in and around the SLOCs.28
Geographically, the vast majority of oil imported to China passes through the
Strait of Malacca, bordered by Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore, and the
Sunda and Lombok Straits in Indonesia. The Strait of Malacca, however, is the central
28 A nation can influence SLOCs in a number of ways. Positive influence would include policing
waterways to ensure that piracy and criminal activity is kept to a minimum, legitimate safety and
environmental inspections of transiting vessels, and maintenance of navigation aides, channels, and piloting
charts. Negative influence could include intrusive inspections for disruptive purposes or preventing traffic
from passage through the SLOCs.
choke point between China and its primary oil suppliers and one of the most important
strategic passages in the world. Fully 30 percent of worldwide shipping passes through
the strait every year. The Strait of Malacca is world's longest navigable strait (800km)
and many of the world's largest tankers can transit through its 23m deep channel. Other
straits such as the Sunda and Lombok straits provide alternative maritime routes to China,
but require significant increases in time and distance traveled, navigation risk, and
shipping capacity requirements. The loss of efficiency increases shipping costs, which
shipping companies pass on to the consumer, resulting in a higher downstream price for
oil.
Transporting cargo through the Strait of Malacca, as opposed to the Sunda Strait,
saves 1,600km and three days in order to reach the South China Sea, saving precious time
Figure 1: Strategic East Asian SLOCs and Choke Points
Source: Dr. Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Hofstra University, April 2006
and money for shipping companies. 29  Also, due to heavy traffic volume, the
governments surrounding the Strait of Malacca (Malaysia and Singapore) have invested
heavily in navigational aides. This reduces shipping insurance rates for vessels using the
strait by removing some of the shipping risk that accompanies sailing through the Sunda
and Lombok straits. Finally and perhaps most importantly, shipping companies maintain
tanker fleet sizes to keep up with a certain demand signal over time. As the time to
transport cargo from the supplier to the consumer increases, shipping companies must
invest in additional capacity to make up for the extra time that ships are in transit and not
in port off-loading their cargo.
Ultimately, the geographic reality of all straits, regardless of distance between
supplier and consumer, leaves them vulnerable to closure. By their very nature, straits
are narrow, relatively shallow choke points that funnel shipping into a small and
vulnerable area. Chinese oil imports must travel through at least one of these choke
points. Unfortunately, China does not directly border any of these choke points and must
therefore rely on other countries to ensure free and open travel through these straits.
E. DISRUPTIONS TO MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
Because Chinese SLOCs follow a tenuous route across thousands of miles of
ocean and through narrow geographic choke points, maritime commerce is vulnerable to
disruptions. One Chinese maritime scholar identifies four main areas that could lead to
disruptions affecting Chinese SLOC security:
29 Since a container ships charter rate is $15,000 to $35,000 per day, shaving three days off of a transit
translates into significant savings for the ship operators. Source: Interglobo International Freight
Forwarders. (http://www.interglobo.it/news/Containership%20Charter%20Market.pdf)
"1) The unstable relationship between regional countries, especially the U.S.,
China, and Japan;
2) Sovereignty disputes and overlapping maritime claims;
3) The ongoing naval build-up by regional countries;
4) Non-conventional actions such as piracy, hijacking, drug trafficking, pollution,
and natural disasters" (Ji 2000).3 0
The first three potentialities are closely related and can be discussed more or less
together. The U.S. and China maintain a stable economic relationship, but there remains
a significant mistrust, especially in the military to military relationship, concerning each
nation's objectives for the region. Although direct military confrontation between China
and the U.S. remains a remote and extraordinarily damaging possibility in the post-Cold
War era, China cannot and does not rely upon the U.S. to defend her interests.
Principally among the factors causing mistrust, the "activist foreign policy of the United
States...after the September 11 terror attacks caused widespread suspicion in China that
the United States is bent on containing China" (Pollpeter 2004, 29). American policy
makers, and those influential to the U.S. policy makers, routinely paint China as a direct
competitor to the U.S (Council on Foreign Relations 2006, 3).3 1 Although the U.S.
supports a free-market approach to resource allocation, the American characterization of
China as an inevitable competitor with the Unites States forces China to confront the
30 Although, environmental factors (natural disasters) can cause temporary disruptions in the SLOCs, their
political effects on maritime security are limited and therefore outside of the scope of this paper.
31 The Council on Foreign Relations' report on National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil Dependency
states in its opening paragraph that with respect to "today's rapidly growing emerging economies of India
and China...at best (the) trends will challenge U.S. foreign policy; at worst, they will seriously strain
relations between the United States and these countries."
possibility that the United States may eventually challenge China for control of natural
resources.
Furthermore, from the Chinese perspective, recent security cooperation
agreements between the U.S. and Indonesia, and Australia and Japan feed Chinese
concerns of being hemmed in by a resurgent American hegemony. The "increasingly
robust bilateral relationship between Indonesia and the United States" creates the
possibility of the U.S. Navy operating more and more frequently in Indonesian waters,
raising concerns for Chinese access to the Sunda and Lombok straits (U.S. Department of
State 2007). Similarly, the recent security agreement signed between Australia and Japan
seems to encourage Japan to make a more activist foreign policy within the region and
evokes still raw Chinese memories of Japanese aggression before and during World War
II. China remains tremendously suspicious of a resurgent Japan.32 Japan currently has
the second most powerful Navy in the region, after the United States, and Japan's
commitment to defense of its SLOCs out to 1000 nautical miles could be a potential
flashpoint to China (Wooley 2000, 71). 33
Another factor pressurizing Chinese maritime security concerns relates to the
"creeping jurisdiction" of various nations surrounding the South China Sea and along
China's SLOCs.34 Currently, China has territorial disputes with the Philippines, South
Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Japan. Each of these nations have signed on to
32 People's Daily On-Line, "Japan's Move for Further Overseas Military Deployments," 15 March 2007.
33 In 1981, with U.S. encouragement, Prime Minister Suzuki declared that defending Japan's SLOCs out to
1000nm was Japan's new policy. A brief look at a map of the East China Sea shows that should Japan
begin strictly interpreting that 1000nm radius of action, it would quickly bump up against Chinese
dominated areas in the East China Sea.
34 "Creeping jurisdiction" also refers to "states in the region taking actions that restrict traditional freedom
of the seas. Proposed constraints often have good motives (safety, anti-pollution, etc.), but cumulatively
would restrict SLOC access in ways potentially quite harmful to regional states themselves, given their
great dependence on SLOC shipping for economic growth" (Weeks 1998).
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which reiterates
principles such as innocent passage and freedom of navigation through international
waterways, but UNCLOS leaves broad leeway for nations to define EEZs. This leeway
provides opportunity for various countries to exert sovereignty over water previously
considered outside of territorial seas and therefore, outside of traditional sovereignty
claims. Ever larger EEZs lead to "overlapping claims of sovereignty" and increases
potential for conflict, which could erode China's maritime security. With potential
reserves of over 7 billion bbls, the China Sea basin has great potential to further China's
(and other competing nations') oil reserves, but remains a potentially volatile area for
China. In fact, China has exercised shows of military force no less than three times since
1974 to enforce its claims to territory in the South China Sea (Ng 2005). The resulting
threat of conflict and the desire to defend maritime economic interests has led to a mini-
naval arms race over the last decade (Umbach 1998, 23).
Threats from non-state actors also have an important impact on China's maritime
security. The effects of non-state actors tend to have more limited and temporary effects
than great power politics, however the "low-noise" rate created by piracy and terrorism
creates a continual strain on maritime security and an upward pressure on shipping costs.
Piracy has been a continual problem not only for China, but also for the region as a
whole. Over 60% of the world's reported piracy incidents occur in the waters of East
Asia, and terrorism remains a large concern (International Chamber of Commerce 2007).
A large tanker hijacked and sunk in the channel of the Strait of Malacca could interfere
with shipping for weeks (if not months), with greatly increased costs associated with
alternate shipping routes.
F. POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC DISRUPTION
Domestic political considerations play an equally, if not more important role in
China's interest in ensuring its access to energy. Reflecting the regime's core belief in
the relationship between economic growth and stability, the Chinese Communist
government feels strongly that the availability of cheaply priced crude oil is necessary for
regime survival and legitimacy. China's fast paced, economic growth has greatly added
to the wealth of the nation as a whole, but has left vast portions of the population
marginalized and disenfranchised. Cheap and abundant oil helps to sustain the increased
living standards of China's middle class and its many industrial enterprises by facilitating
domestic transportation costs and literally fueling the expansion of the domestic auto and
petrochemical industries. Perhaps most importantly from the regime's perspective, a
cheap crude oil supply is critical to the many rural sectors of the Chinese economy,
particularly agriculture, that are extraordinarily vulnerable to price fluctuations and
market elasticity. The Chinese government provides heavily subsidized petroleum
products to its farmers in the form of fuel and fertilizers. Should the regime no longer
have the ability to provide cheap fuel and fertilizer, the resulting under-performance of
the agriculture sector could create hundreds of millions of unemployed farmers, at best,
and famine-like conditions similar to North Korea, at worst. Recent years have seen ever
greater numbers of "disturbances" in the rural regions of China for various reasons such
as pollution and food prices, but those disturbances would likely be miniscule in
comparison to a large rural uprising. 35 The resulting threat to the social and civil order
35 For a sample of the reporting on riots in China, see, Yardley, Jim. "Rural Chinese Riot as Police Try to
Halt Pollution Protest," New York Times, 14 April 2005 (50-60,000 protestors to fight pollution); BBC
places an extra burden on Chinese interests, requiring aggressive Chinese efforts to
ensure access to the global energy supply.
G. CHINESE INITIATIVES TO MITIGATE TRANSPORTATION RISK
In response to the potential for disruptions to its SLOC security, China has
implemented several strategies to mitigate the risk associated with those disruptions and
their effects on China's energy security. Chinese initiatives have centered on
diversifying and increasing supply, diversifying transportation alternatives, increasing
transportation capacity, and building military credibility that addresses perceived
imbalances in regional naval power relationships. These initiatives are designed to
increase both China's energy and maritime transportation security and its overall strategic
position with respect to potential competitors.
China's efforts to expand their energy supply and their efforts to diversify their
transportation alternatives are closely related. In an effort to increase supply, China has
recently teamed with several international oil companies (IOCs) by signing production-
sharing agreements to develop domestic offshore fields. China also continues to open
some onshore fields in northwest China for exploration by IOCs (EIA 2006). However,
even expanded offshore domestic production cannot hope to keep up with increasing
demand. In response to China's increasing reliance on foreign oil, the Chinese national
oil companies (NOCs) (Sinopec, CNPC, and CNOOC) are aggressively pursuing
exploration and production contracts abroad. All three of China's NOCs have signed
agreements for production and exploration in foreign countries. Chinese attempts to
News Online, "Security Tight in China Riot Town," Updated: 15 March 2007. (20,000-person riot to
protest increased bus fares).
"lock-up" future production are not without controversy. CNPC, which has agreements
in 21 countries, recently announced that it would invest a further $18 billion in Sudan's
oil industry, including a pipeline to the Red Sea (EIA 2006).36 Deals like the Sudan
infrastructure investment contracts impose considerable cost on PRC foreign policy
efforts elsewhere, but China's general unwillingness to support UN efforts to mediate the
Darfur crisis reflects the Chinese concern for securing reliable energy supplies.
Finding alternative means to transport energy supplies once they are acquired has
also taken on renewed importance in China. Overland, transnational pipelines seem to
offer the greatest promise of eliminating many of the risks associated with maritime
transportation security. Russia's announced plans to build a pipeline from Angarsk in
Siberia to Nakhoda on the Sea of Japan, suggests that Japan is set to be the primary
beneficiary of a Siberian pipeline. Although the Russians have not announced a plan to
build a pipeline to Daqing, the announcement that the Nakhodka route will go through
Skovorodino leaves open the opportunity for a future spur to Daqing (EIA 2007, 6-7).
The Chinese have also taken some more innovative approaches to reducing risk in
the SLOCs. Since the Strait of Malacca provides the most critical choke point in the
Chinese SLOCs, the Chinese had explored the potential for a canal across the Kra
peninsula in Thailand, eliminating the transit through the Strait of Malacca, but "balked
at the estimated $20-25 billion dollar price tag" (Storey 2007). Other innovative
proposals have included an underground pipeline across Thailand, and a China-Pakistan
energy corridor. In both of those proposals, energy resources would still have to travel
36 China has been reluctant to participate in US-led initiatives to limit Sudanese investment, but has
recently become more responsive to supporitng UN action in Darfur. This may possibly be due to China's
increased self-awareness of their human rights record and increased potential for scrutiny of that record as
the Olympics in Beijing grow nearer.
across difficult terrain and politically unstable regions. The most promising proposal
seems to be a proposed $2 billion Burma-China transnational pipeline. Oil would
proceed along a 750-mile pipeline from Sittwe to Kunming, thereby eliminating the Strait
of Malacca from the transportation equation.
China is also consolidating control and expanding the capacity of its merchant
tanker fleet as yet another step to mitigate its maritime transportation risk. China is
reportedly undertaking a major commercial shipbuilding plan, which will add 65 super
tankers to its merchant fleet by 2012. 37 The principal naval architect at one Chinese
shipyard has been quoted as saying, "it is all about national energy security. We have to
be able to use our own ships to transport oil."38 A dramatic increase in tanker capacity
gives the Chinese much greater control and flexibility in managing demand surges at
home and managing the longer routes required of tankers in the event of a crisis in the
SLOCs.
Finally, China has recently embarked on a well publicized and reported
modernization and building program for the PLAN. An increase in both numbers and
quality of surface ships and modem submarines reflects China's concern that in a military
crisis its ships carrying energy resources could be interdicted. The PLAN's naval
doctrine not only emphasizes SLOC security, but also "blockading major SLOCs
effectively and within a required span of time in the waters encompassing China's
maritime territories" (Ji 1999, 165-166). China's naval build-up concerns traditional
maritime powers such as the United States and Japan, but as China's maritime interests
rise, so will its desire to provide a credible maritime component to its military.
37 Lague, David. "China Begins Expanding its Supertanker Fleet," International Herald Tribune, 16 May
2007.
38 Ibid.
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IV: CONSTRAINTS TO NAVAL EXPANSION AND DEVELOPMENT
China's substantial maritime interests present a compelling case for increased
defense outlays to produce a naval force capable of ensuring their defense. However,
China, like other nations who have made the commitment to invest in sea power, faces
significant challenges in developing a PLAN robust enough to credibly respond to its
varied and growing and increasingly global maritime interests. Fiscal constraints
resulting from competition for resources within the national budget process,
technological limitations due to a nascent and unresponsive military industrial complex, a
reliance on the continued strength of the global economy, and external political pressures
exerted by potential competitors all create limits to China's ability to create a robust
naval modernization and expansion program.
A. BUDGETARY CONSTRAINT: KEEPING THE PLA HAPPY
Even for China, a precipitous increase in defense spending would first have to
overcome major domestic hurdles. Before any decision on future force structure is made,
China must make take into account many critical fiscal considerations that compete for
annual resource allocation. 39 The CCP's Central Committee controls the purse strings,
but the PLA is the communist party's coercive element and remains critical to
maintaining party legitimacy and strength. The demands of the PLA leadership for
39 China has real budgetary pressures despite unprecedented economic progress. As China's overall
economy has grown, so have overall government expenditures. A recent RAND report examines the
pressure on the government to increase expenditures on social programs, education, medical care, and
infrastructure and how those expenditures prevent an "unrestricted" military spending program. In fact,
although China's tax revenues have expanded by 433percent in real terms since 1978, government outlays
have surpassed tax revenue and have risen 505 percent. (Crane et. al. 2005, 51).
funding do not fall on deaf ears among the party elite. In an effort to improve both
military and economic efficiency and business transparency, recent reforms have
removed nearly all of the PLA's industrial and business enterprises. On the positive side
of the ledger, the PLA enterprises contributed extra budgetary funds to the general coffers
of the PLA, provided constructive peacetime employment opportunities for the vast
manpower reserves of the PLA, and supplemented generally poor central government
personnel spending. Negatively, these enterprises contributed to the overall perception of
corruption within the government by providing illicit sources of income for PLA leaders.
Furthermore, many of the PLA businesses had involved extra-legal enterprises such as
music and software pirating.40 The CCP understands that the PLA remains a critical
constituency, but also must ensure that the PLA remains the servant of the party and not
the other way around. While some PLA leaders call for an increasing share of the overall
central budget to realize its strategic vision, the CCP seems to recognize that it must walk
a fine line between exerting authority over the PLA by controlling budgetary outlays and
potentially isolating PLA leaders by not providing them with increased shares of an
expanding budget.
Defense expenditures, while rising, have not topped greater than 2% of GDP since
1986 (Crane 2005, 110). Although the total outlay (in real dollars) for the military has
40 The effects of these business practices have been characterized as "corrosive" both to the PLA as an
effective organization of national defense and legitimacy. As early as the 1920's Mao encouraged the PLA
to maintain self-sufficiency in producing its own food and armaments. By the 1990's, the PLA was
involved in business activities as varied as TV production, management of discos and hotels, airline and
trucking companies, and real-estate. Remarkably, while the PLA seemed to be involved in nearly every
type of business enterprise in China, it was not heavily involved in armament production or many military
specific businesses. An emphasis on business enterprises at the expense of military performance
significantly contributed to a level of corruption and inefficiency in PLA development that ran counter to
the CCP's objectives. Partially as a result of continuing economic reform and partially as a way to reform
the PLA, the CCP ordered the PLA to divest its business enterprises in 1998. For further views on effects
and consequences of the PLA's business enterprises, see (Mulvenon 2001; Scobell 2000; and Suettinger
2004, 245).
increased at an average rate of 10 percent per year every year since 1996, the percentage
of the military budget as a percentage of total government expenditures has decreased
from 15 percent of the annual budget in the mid 1970's to less than eight percent in 2002.
As a percentage of GDP, the military budget stood at 5.5% in 1979, 1.06% in 1996, and
1.72% in 2003.41 However, due to the lack of transparency in the Chinese budget
process, there is much debate with respect to the validity of budgetary numbers released
by the government.42 For example, a sample of various analysts estimates of the actual
1994 military expenditure of the PRC range from a low of $6.3 billion (official PRC data)
to a high of $152 billion. (Crane et al. 2005, 109-111, 152). It is important to remember
that no matter what the actual amount of reported Chinese military spending used, it
would be difficult for China to hide a large military build-up. A large military expansion
program would require outlays some order of magnitude greater than currently in place
and would send a financial signal that would be visible to economic and military
observers.
B. BUDGETARY CONSTRAINT: KEEPING THE PEOPLE HAPPY
Ultimately, the PRC must manage these fiscal constraints in order avoid social
disruptions that may result from a failure to provide the social programs that it has
promised the people of China. The PRC, therefore, finds itself balancing its desire to
41 Recognizing its relative impotence when confronted with American sea power, China's increase in
military spending as a percentage of GDP began to rise after the 1996 Taiwan crisis where the U.S. sent
two aircraft carrier strike groups to within 500nm of Taiwan in response to increased PLA coercive
pressure on Taiwan.
Even the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) seems frustrated at the difficulty in discerning actual
PRC defense outlays and contributes a lack of transparency in the budget as "an outgrowth of a political
system in which military spending, along with other aspects of military posture, is treated as a state secret"
(CMP 2007, 20). This clearly creates a problem as projections of Chinese defense spending end up
providing a high and low level of projected outlays compared to the officially announced levels.
protect its economic and political interests abroad by expanding its military power and
reach with the necessity to provide for an increasingly expectant, demanding, and
expanding population.43 Ironically for China, if not managed carefully, the amount of
resources required to build, operate, and maintain a recapitalized and expanded fleet
could also threaten security and economic growth by draining funds from other budgetary
priorities like health care, education, pensions, and infrastructure investment that
contribute to the economic growth.
The large amounts of upfront outlays required to procure and build military
equipment is one of the drawbacks of military spending programs. Naval construction
programs, especially, take substantial initial capital investments, years in advance of
projected operational capability, to procure the extremely large and complex weapon
systems required by modem navies.44 Again, the Chinese leadership is cognizant of its
reliance on continued economic growth, both at home and abroad, and the potential
effects of an economic downturn to its standing. A commitment to a naval construction
program may seem affordable under some economic conditions, but a global economic
downturn can result in an inability to re-capture the initial capital investment of military
spending programs in the event of changing budget priorities, leaving holes in a budget
that are difficult to plug. In fact, during the 1990's many Asian nations, with expanding
43 This balancing act is not unique among nations, but the fiscal constraints on China are exacerbated by
vast social entitlements promised by the government and an incredibly large, increasingly affluent and
expectant population. Furthermore, China's population is not only increasing, but aging. Governmental
expenditures on health care and other social programs, threaten to overwhelm the government without
continued economic growth.
For example, the U.S. Navy's SeawolfSSN program required an initial outlay of $2.9 billion (1998)
dollars for research and development. The estimated cost of the initial submarines was $3.2 billion with
cost eventually coming down to $1.9 billion. These types of front-end cost for naval weapon systems are
typical and reflect not only R&D costs, but the high costs of initial construction. Savings in naval weapons
systems generally is only recognized with revolutionary new construction technologies or with an economy
of scale that the PLAN has yet to show in its construction programs of new ships (Congressional Budget
Office, 1997).
treasuries, began naval construction programs, sparking a mini naval arms race in Asia
(Meconis and Wallace 2000). The Asian financial crisis of the late 1990's caused an
abrupt change in priorities that caused many nations to cancel orders, resulting in
"wasted" initial outlays.
With China both running a deficit budget and committed to supporting the
Chinese defense industries by procuring as much indigenously constructed systems as
possible, an economic downturn could have the result of placing the central government
between a rock and a hard place. Following an economic downturn after a large
budgetary commitment to a defense spending program, the CCP would have to decide
whether to fund military spending at the expense of reduced domestic programs or cut
defense spending. In either case, the CCP would risk alienating the population as a
whole or the PLA. Furthermore, the cancellation of defense programs produced in China
would not only result in lost capital outlays, but also potentially in significant numbers of
unemployed, skilled workers. The possibility of this "double whammy" seems to be
present in the minds of Chinese decision makers as they seek a balance in budget
priorities in order to provide stability without sacrificing economic growth.45
45 China's economic recovery and the primacy of economic progress have their foundations in the "Four
Modernizations" officially recognized by Deng Xiaoping's in 1978. The core elements of the Four
Modernizations prioritized reform and progress (in descending order of priority) in Agriculture, Industry,
Science and Technology, and National Defense. Although national defense was clearly announced as one
of Deng's priorities, spending on defense related projects took and continues to take a back seat to
economic progress. At the time of Deng's initiation of the Four Modernizations, official military spending
consisted of 5.5% of GDP and nearly 18% of the total budget; actual spending may have been higher. The
Chinese economy was also performing at a level less than 10% of the current economy. The goals set by
Deng precluded a great increase in military spending (Crane et al. 2005).
C. TECHNOLOGICAL RESTRAINT: A NASCENT MILITARY-
INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
The embryonic nature of China's technology sector and military-industrial base
provides further critical restraints on its ability to rapidly establish a technologically
superior naval capability. Modern navies require vast amounts of high-tech components
and systems integration to produce an operationally functional fleet. China still relies on
foreign supply for various major components for its ships, aircraft, and submarines. 46 A
lack of domestic manufacturing and technological ability leaves the PRC vulnerable to
the political whims of the nations that supply its military hardware and dependent on their
continued cooperation for support and technological expertise (Cole 2001, 65). As an
example of the transient nature of foreign support, western nations have, since
Tiananmen Square in 1989, banned the sale of most military components and weapon
systems to the PRC. Normalization of relations with the Soviet Union provided a new
source of weaponry and technology, and since 1989, the PRC has looked primarily to
Russia as its major arms supplier, securing large contracts for destroyers, fighter aircraft,
aerial refueling aircraft, electronic early warning aircraft, advanced integrated air defense
systems, and submarines (CMP 2007, 26-29).
China has tried to invigorate its nascent domestic military technology sector, but
still lags far behind western and even Russian standards due to systemic inefficiencies,
outdated manufacturing and managerial processes. A recent RAND report identifies two
main factors that limit Chinese industrial output and innovation: the state-owned nature
of Chinese defense industries and the lack of direct competition resulting between those
46 For further analysis of the limits and growth of China's military industrial capacity, see (Crane et al.
2005; Cole 2001; and CMP 2007).
companies (Cliff 2006). Both of these factors significantly limit the ability to the
Chinese military industrial base to innovate or improve efficiency. The actual industrial
capacity of the Chinese defense sector is generally considered good. Since it is easier to
manufacture or reverse engineer existing technologies than create new ones, the "catch-
up" nature of China's military modernization facilitates the process of defense
modernization for China's defense industries. However, the Chinese defense industry
still lags behind western standards in systems integration and technological innovation.47
China has shown little or no capability to field non-existing or revolutionary
technologies, but it has shown increasing ability to produce modem and capable systems
based on existing technology. 48 The report concludes that, without further western
technological investment, China's defense industry does have the capability to close the
technology gap with western forces, but the nature of the Chinese defense industry
structure presents little likelihood that China can surpass the U.S. in technological
superiority. For this reason, the report supports continued western defense research and
development and fielding of advanced military systems to prevent Chinese parity in
military technology.
47 For example, the Chinese National Shipbuilding Company has a the ability to produce a large amount of
well constructed ships, but the systems installed in those ships (including propulsion systems, fire control
systems, radars, and some weapon systems) must come from foreign sources and often require long-term
contracts with those same nations to install and repair those systems (O'Rourke 2007, 22).
48 However, the Chinese have had significant difficulty fielding and producing some advanced, existing
technologies. Perhaps the most publicized examples of a struggling Chinese defense industry are the J-10
fighter and the Song class submarine. The J-10 fighter is designed as a replacement for much of the
Chinese fighter fleet, but took nearly 20 years to design and produce and is still only considered an
equivalent of the F-16, a thirty year-old design. The Song class diesel-electric submarine was initially
designed as a replacement for the aging fleet of Ming and Foxtrot submarines. In both cases, development
and production problems have resulted in significant delays and a resort to buying Russian Su-27 fighters
and Kilo diesel-electric submarines as replacements to provide a stopgap capability until production and
design difficulties could be resolved.
D. AN UNAFFORDABLE ARMS RACE?
China also recognizes that other countries have a vote in any military or naval
modernization and expansion program that it chooses to pursue. For example, the United
States and Japan both have significant economic and security interests in the region and
will not likely abandon those interests in response to increased Chinese defense spending
or expanded Chinese presence in the China Sea or its vital SLOCs. In fact, China's
recent declaratory emphasis on developing and protecting its maritime interests clearly
exacerbates U.S. and Japanese fears of China's own regional hegemonic intentions
(Japanese Ministry of Defense 2007, hereafter JMOD; CMP 2007). The U.S. and Japan
would most likely "circle the wagons" in an effort to maintain the existing military
balance in Asia" (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2007, 3;
hereafter USCC). Potential U.S./Japanese responses could include expanded defense
spending to increase numbers and capabilities of systems specifically designed to counter
Chinese strengths, a further enlargement of U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation, and
potentially an expansion of regional security arrangements between the U.S. and other
regional nations (USCC 2007). 4 9
Japan, despite the limits of its constitution, has effectively responded to its various
security challenges. As Japan increased its naval capability during the Cold War, its
defense policy migrated toward a "forward defense of the islands" (Wooley 2000).50 In
the 1970s, Japan's maritime strategists envisioned "a guerre de course as the most likely
kind of conflict in the western Pacific" (Wooley 2000, 68). This type of war meant the
49 Specific ideas to maintain the regional military balance proposed by the Commission include: "creating a
flexible base structure, maintaining long-range forces, and supporting stealthy submarine and aircraft
systems."
5o This policy is very similar to the Chinese desire to provide an "active defense' out to the "second island
chain" and is remarkably based on very similar maritime interests.
likelihood of mine (MIW) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) against the Soviets. They
responded by investing in high quality ASW and MIW technologies and hardware.
Throughout the decade under American tutelage, Japan built up its naval forces until it
had the numbers and necessary skills to operate independently away from coastal waters.
In 1981, Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki publicly committed Japan to the defense of its
SLOCs out to 1000nm. "Forward defense" of the homeland became a hallmark of
Japanese defense policy.
Recently, however, several high-profile PLAN incursions into disputed waters
highlighted the need for Japan to modify its policy in response to a perceived Chinese
aggressiveness in Japanese claimed areas of influence. First, in November 2004, a
Chinese Han class submarine completed a submerged transit from its base in Qingdao,
through the Osumi Strait and around Guam, before surfacing for the return transit (Fisher
2005). Second, in January and again in September 2005, a PLAN surface task group
steamed in the vicinity of the claimed Japanese EEZ near the disputed Chunxiao gas
fields. Although the PLAN surface group remained on the Chinese side of the Japanese
declared EEZ, the presence of a seemingly coordinated naval group near the Chunxiao
fields was unprecedented and stirred fears of expanded Chinese interests in the area. The
September incursion included a relatively robust PLAN force of one Sovremenny Class
destroyer, two older frigates, a replenishment ship, and an electronic intelligence ship.51
51 These actions clearly show the PLAN's desire to operate combined, coordinated surface action groups: a
necessary skill for any modern power projection force (Fisher 2005).
In all cases, including the Han incident, either JMSDF P-3C maritime patrol aircraft
(MPA) or Japanese surface ships continually tracked the Chinese forces.5 2
In 2006, the Japanese Defense Agency responded by announcing "new defense
policies," that stress the need for "countermeasures against invasion to the neighboring
waters" and "marine/aerial surveillance and countermeasures against airspace incursion
or unidentified armed ships" (JMOD 2006, 10). The thinly veiled reference in the "new
defense policies" to recent Chinese incursions reflects the Japanese government's rising
concern toward the increasing capabilities and uncertain intentions of the PLAN and the
likelihood that any increases in Chinese naval capabilities or radius of action would be
met by a similar Japanese response.
In light of China's domestic spending concerns and the constraints that are present
in its resource allocation decisions, the PRC can little afford to engage in a spending
battle with the U.S. Similarly, while most observers believe that the PRC currently
outspends Japan in annual defense expenditures, Japan's economy is still larger than
China's for at least the next few years, and with an annual defense budget that barely tops
one percent of GDP annually, Japan has the fiscal elasticity to expand defense spending.
Furthermore, strengthened U.S. bi-lateral defense and political ties with other Asian-
Pacific nations, serves as natural barrier to Chinese territorial and political interests in the
region.
Therefore, as China seeks to expand and defend its growing maritime interests, it
does face significant political, economic, and technological constraints and restraints. On
the one hand, the regime cannot ignore the defense constituency that provides it with
52 In one case, a PLAN surface ship trained a 100mm gun on a JMSDF P-3, eliciting no response from the
airplane. These types of incidents are reminiscent of US/USSR interactions in the Cold War and show the
potential for escalation between Japan and China (Fisher 2005).
coercive legitimacy by under-funding defense. On the other hand, China cannot spend
too lavishly on a navy without potentially over-leveraging itself on defense and leaving
itself exposed on other budgetary priorities. China has reaped the benefits of a buoyant
world-wide economy that leaves it with the fiscal wherewithal to purchase both foreign
defense systems and increase indigenous defense capacity. But as China closes the
technology gap, the cost of its systems and capabilities will increase. If China does not
harness greater efficiency and technological innovation in its defense industry, it may
find the greater costs of the weapons and technologies required to provide its increased
military capabilities conflict with other budgetary priorities. Finally, China cannot ignore
the possibility of a spiraling arms race created by an increased Chinese presence and
capability in the maritime domain. Increased defense spending is likely to encourage
other nations with interests in Asia-Pacific to follow suit and pursue increased defense
capabilities and numbers as a response to China.
V: THE PLAN'S DOCTRINAL/MARITIME STRATEGY
DEVELOPMENT: OVERCOMING THE INERTIA OF A
CONTINENTAL OUTLOOK5 3
The primary influence on Chinese military thought since the end of the Second
Chinese Civil War has been the continental outlook formed by the necessity to defend
against an invasion by superior forces on China's north and northwest borders. For
pragmatic reasons, Chinese military doctrine initially developed along fundamentally
defensive lines, with a central theme requiring the PLA to defeat a superior adversary
(Godwin 2003, 45). Subsequent development of the PRC's military doctrine has
consistently reflected this continental position and the qualitative (if not quantitative)
material disadvantages of the PLA. Although initially restrained by Mao's resistance to
modernization and still deferring (at least symbolically) to Mao's People's War dictum,
Chinese military thought has shown a capacity for development in response to changing
national capability and external threats.
Initially, the PRC gave little thought, and indeed had limited ability, to develop
any kind of comprehensive naval doctrine or a maritime strategy. With little variation,
the pattern of threats stemming from internal dissention and invasion from the north
continued unbroken after the Communist Party assumed power in 1949.5 4 Prior to the
53 For the past 500 years, China has had an inward and continental focus to its interests.
Throughout this time period, China has maintained a view of the sea more "as a potential invasion route for
foreign aggressors rather than as a medium for achieving national goals." However, in the twenty-first
century, as China seeks to re-establish a maritime presence, the PLAN does have, at least, an ancient
maritime tradition upon which to draw (Cole 2001).
54 After Chiang Kai-Shek abandoned Mainland China, the Nationalists did prosecute a limited campaign of
coastal raids on the mainland and communist controlled islands, but Mao's focused on consolidating
mid 1980's, neither maritime doctrine nor maritime strategy truly existed within the
Chinese military lexicon. Within the last twenty years though, Chinese military doctrine
has gradually evolved from the continental perspective to a more maritime and global
worldview. As a result, the PLAN has been able to construct and elaborate maritime
strategies, which reflect an appreciation for Chinese interests and limitations.5 5 China's
current political and military leadership seems to recognize the importance of protecting
its growing maritime interests.56 Yet challenges remain, and the PLAN must still
overcome a vast institutional inertia in restructuring and reorganizing itself into a
maritime force capable of defending the range of economic and political interests that it
now interprets as vital to regime survival.
A. PEOPLE'S WAR
From the outset, Mao recognized that China suffered significant qualitative
technological disadvantages when compared with many of China's potential adversaries.
Domestically, the Chinese Civil War ended with two separate Chinas, resulting in an
incomplete victory and further struggle for unification. In the broader international
realm, the socialist fraternity enjoyed between China and the Soviet Union gave way to
increased tensions. By 1960, the PRC and the U.S.S.R.'s political tug-of-war for control
control of the countryside and eliminating nationalist influence on the mainland, not eliminating peripheral
maritime disruptions.
5 While maintaining fundamentally Chinese characteristics of national security doctrine, the PLAN's
strategy, doctrine, and even tactical utilization of forces still reflects a distinctly Russian influence. The
reliance on Soviet, and later Russian, equipment, doctrinal, and tactical expertise remains a continuing
theme for the PLAN. In the years following the evacuation of the mainland by Nationalist forces, the PRC
could barely afford a coastal defense force, much less any kind of substantial navy. The PLAN depended
upon an injection of Soviet money and expertise to jumpstart its nascent maritime capability (Cole 2001; Ji
1999).
56 From 1950-1980, the China spent only 18.4% of the military budget on the PLAN (Crane, et al. 2005,
110). For a point of comparison, the U.S. spends roughly 30% of its defense expenditures on the
Department of the Navy (U.S. Department of Defense 2007b).
of the worldwide communist movement, which began as a philosophical battle for the
direction of communism, escalated into a nationalistic stand off, as both countries
squared off militarily on the Sino-Soviet border. The Sino-Soviet split and the growing
imbalance of forces on the border favoring the Soviets further reinforced the Chinese
continental viewpoint and their inferiority with respect to the modem military
opponent.57
As a means to deter China's more technologically superior foes, Mao developed
and relied upon his "People's War" doctrine. This "total war" doctrine sought to
leverage China's large landmass and quantitative advantage in manpower to compensate
for the qualitative inferiority of the PLA. Utilizing superior manpower to offset inferior
weapons and technology, Mao considered People's War the only feasible deterrent for an
economically and technologically underdeveloped nation to defend against powerful
adversaries like the U.S.S.R. or the United States. People's War would mobilize the
population and draw the enemy into the heartland of China, in order to wage a protracted
war that would sap the resources of an enemy. The PLA, in turn, developed a force
structure to reflect Mao's ideology.58 In the case of the Sino-Soviet rift, Mao's strategy
proved a successful deterrent. "That the Soviet Union failed to do in China what it did to
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan showed its appreciation of the prospective
57 Although military conflict did break out between the two countries, it was contained within several
casualty-intensive, but strategically minor border skirmishes. With almost a million and a half troops on
both sides facing each other, and the threat of nuclear response a possibility, a very real potential for major
conflict with the Soviet Union threatened China. Other than defending against a possible, but highly
unlikely, Soviet invasion by sea, Mao saw little reason to look seaward. The PRC and Russia did fully
conclude the border dispute until 2005.
58 To ensure communist control of the Chinese countryside, the PLA provided Mao's government with the
essential coercive element necessary to compel internal social order and the communist power base. One
explanation of the PLA's significant "backwardness in technological capability and advanced military
operational doctrine is that communist party control over the Army is of such great importance to the
communist party cadre that it has purposely prioritized "ideological reliability" and communist educational
credentials over military hardware and operational acumen (Cole 2001, 22).
prohibitive cost in invading a country of China's size and huge hostile population.
People's War was an effective deterrent precisely because it makes virtues of the factors
and exploits China's few advantages" (Ji 1999, 2)
As its name suggests, the PLAN has traditionally assumed an adjunct role to the
PLA. 59 Under Mao, the PLAN was conceived as a defensive force designed to harass
and delay an invading military from utilizing China's coastal areas. Force structure
decisions of the early PLAN were internally constrained not only by the limited
importance placed on them under the people's war doctrine, but by the limited financial
resources and indigenous technological capacity (shipbuilding, etc.) available. In this
respect, Russian material largess and educational assistance played an influential part in
PLAN doctrinal development. In 1950, Mao obtained a $300 million loan to purchase
Soviet naval vessels, establishing a naval relationship with the Soviet Union, which
included sending Chinese naval officers to Soviet naval schools.
In the pre-war era, some Soviet naval officers had espoused a large blue water
navy on par with the great navies of the world. World War II had halted those plans, and
any hope to revitalize them was dashed by the financial realities of maintaining large
occupation forces in Eastern Europe and the terrible condition of the Soviet economy
after the war. In the immediate post-war era, the Soviet Union could not hope to compete
with the global U.S. naval power demonstrated during the war. Therefore, in an effort to
find an asymmetrical approach to defending against American sea power, the "young
59 Focused on consolidating his continental position, Mao saw little need for a commanding navy,
preferring to rely upon the PLAN as a coastal defense force designed to delay an invasion from the sea. In
1950, Admiral Xiao Jingguang, Commander-in-Chief of the PLAN described the ideal PLAN as one that
"...should be a light type navy, capable of coastal defense. Its key mission is to accompany the ground
forces in war actions. The basic characteristic of this navy is fast deployment, based on its lightness" (Ji
1999, 164). As late as 1980, Deng Xiaoping "reemphasized the Navy's role as a coastal defense force...
'Our navy...should conduct coastal operations. It is a defensive force. Everything in the construction of
the navy must accord with this guiding principle"' (Cole 2001, 24).
school" of Soviet naval doctrine re-emerged (Ji 1999, 164; Cole 2001; 161-163). Instead
of advocating a large battle fleet, the "young school" proposed an affordable fleet
composed of numerous smaller ships that could protect the immediate maritime
"territory" of the Soviet Union, placing an initial emphasis on diesel-electric submarines
that could keep U.S. striking forces away from the Soviet mainland. This Soviet
doctrinal philosophy had profound influence on Chinese naval doctrine. In this "small
battle" theory, light warships, land based planes, and submarines would provide the
defensive power to repel an attack from the sea.
This approach appealed greatly to nations (such as post war China and the Soviet
Union) with little need to project power ashore and with little reliance on the sea for trade
and resources. With many of the Chinese naval officers training in the Soviet Union and
with the Soviet Union providing not only the initial funding, but also the actual
construction of naval vessels and aircraft, the Chinese naturally adopted the Soviets'
"small battle" doctrine. "Designed for 'guerilla skirmishes against invaders from the
sea,"' this doctrine fit well within Mao's people's war theory (Ji 1999, 165). Therefore,
on the maritime front, the operational and fiscal realities of People's War doctrine
coupled with Soviet influence obscured any real attempt at creating a formidable and
doctrinally individual navy.
B. PEOPLE'S WAR TO FORWARD (OFFSHORE) DEFENSE
When Deng Xiaoping assumed control of the CMC in late 1970's, the stage was
set to alter the decades old People's War doctrine. Several of the factors that had
suggested a People's War doctrine as appropriate for China had fundamentally changed
since Mao initially created People's War doctrine. First, China had developed a small,
but respectable nuclear second-strike capability for deterrence. Second, China's military
had begun to gain confidence in its abilities. It had acquired significant military
hardware (including tanks and airplanes) to feel confident that it could adequately assume
a positional defense structure to defend China. Finally, the Communist party itself went
through significant changes as it sought to protect its legitimacy. Liberalizing and
modernization of China's economy took on renewed importance. Yet as China's
economy expanded, it created challenges to Mao's doctrine.
The economic development on or near China's eastern coast realistically did not
allow the PLA to trading space for time as envisioned in Mao's People's War. A loss or
destruction of China's economic heartland would have disastrous consequences for the
country and the regime. Deng realized that in order to protect its borders, he would need
to modify Mao's doctrine and provide for an "active" defense that would prevent an
invader from penetrating deeply into China. Upon assuming chairmanship of the CMC,
Deng began a program of military reform. Deng's modified Mao's "active defense" to
"forward defense" and then to "People's War Under Modem Conditions." The PLAN's
leadership had also exhibited an increasing desire to develop a maritime strategy
(although one grounded in actual capabilities) that supports its expanded missions. By
1985, the PLAN had officially discarded the Mao's "coastal defense" policies and
adopted the Deng's new "Forward Defense" (U.S. Department of the Navy 2007, 25;
hereafter ONI)
Figure 2: Geographic Extent of First and Second Island Chains
Source: (CMP 2007)
Development of the PLAN's answer to Deng's active defense policy fell to
Admiral Liu Huqing. Liu called the new doctrine "offshore active defense." Consisting
primarily of three phases, Liu's maritime strategy called for China's control of the sea out
to the "first island" by 2000 and the "second island chain" by 2020 (Figure 2). In a third
phase, Liu proposed that China achieve a global maritime presence by 2050 (Cole 2001,
166-167). 60 Phase one of Liu's maritime strategy consisted of "stubborn defense near the
shore, mobile warfare at sea, and surprise guerilla-like attacks at sea" (Cole 2001, 166).
Although couched in Maoist diction, Liu's strategy differs significantly because it
proposes that China confront its maritime challenges not on its own doorstep, but
offshore, away from China's shores.
60 The Chinese have also called the area covered by first phase of Liu's offshore defense strategy, the East
and South China Seas as "green water."
Not surprisingly, the evolution of Liu's "offshore defense" strategy closely
parallels the development of contemporary Soviet maritime strategy. Bernard Cole traces
this development and argues that Liu's strategy directly derives from Soviet influence:
By the mid-1980's, Soviet maritime strategy had settled on a division of its coastal waters
into defense zones out to about 2,000 nautical miles. Liu Huaqing's maritime "phases"
almost certainly owe their origin to the earlier Soviet "zones," the innermost of which
was called the "area of sea control." The second zone was the "area of sea denial"; the
third was a broad region for long-range reconnaissance and submarine interdiction. The
first and second Soviet zones, extending seaward 1,500 nautical miles, closely match
Liu's two island chains, the second of which lies about 1,350 to 1,500 nautical miles from
China's coast (Cole 2001, 167).
The clear influence of Russian doctrinal thought on the Chinese seems similar to its
reliance on Russia for the PLAN's technological development. Although, China put
great efforts into indigenous design, production, and deployment of modem naval
weapon systems like the Han class nuclear attack submarine and the Xia class nuclear
missile submarine, the Chinese were forced by necessity to rely upon Russian designs
and production assistance. Similarly, Chinese naval strategy and doctrine relied upon
Russian assistance. The similarity between Liu's Offshore Defense and the Russian
maritime strategy might signify that China may have felt (or at least had been aware of)
similar material limitations and political constraints that the Soviet Navy did when
confronting its maritime defenses, but it also may have reflected a certain lack of
confidence within the PLAN to developing its own maritime strategy aligned with
Chinese interests and capabilities. 61
C. CONTINUING DEVELOPMENT: "LOCAL WAR UNDER CONDITIONS
OF INFORMATIZATION"
Shortly after the development of Liu's offshore defense for the PLAN, the PLA
began to re-evaluate the active defense policy in response to the accelerating pace of
military technological development. Taking lessons from the United States' conduct of
the Persian Gulf War, the PLA began a rapid push to emphasize modernization and
quality at the expense of quantity. The PLA initially identified this new type of conflict
as "local war in high-tech conditions," but has recently elaborated it as "local wars under
conditions of informatization" (CMP 2007, 11; CND 2006).
Informatization "emphasizes the role of modern information technology as a
force-multiplier enabling the PLA to conduct military operations with precision and at
greater distances from China's borders" (CMP 2007, 11). The qualitative revolution
within the PLA has provided a definite push to upgrade and improve the PLAN's
equipment, training, and development of joint methods of warfare. However the PLAN
is playing "catch-up" not only within the realm of technological capability and doctrine,
but also in numbers. The PLAN realizes that even if it eventually equals the United
States in technological capability, the high costs of modem weapon systems coupled with
61 Although "Offshore Defense" has normally been linked to the "first" and "second island chains"
geographic description, many PLAN researchers now believe that "the term 'Offshore Defense' [no longer]
impl[ies] any geographic limits or boundaries." See, (ONI 2007, 26). The Han class SSN is almost
universally derided as one of the loudest and, therefore most easily detectable submarines in the world.
Only one Xia submarine was ever produced, and although it successfully fired a JL- 1 intermediate range
ballistic missile, it is reported that it has been to sea only once since commissioning (Cole 2001, 98).
the fiscal constraints created by the smaller Chinese central budget may prevent
quantitative parity. This places stress on the PLAN to find doctrine, or "principles," and
alternative weapon systems that match their constraints, support their interests, and
exploit potential asymmetries in future competitors. 62
D. MARITIME STRATEGY: FORWARD OFFSHORE DEFENSE
As successive commanders have promoted the growth of Chinese maritime
power, so have the PLAN's missions and doctrine matured. The PLAN leadership now
foresees four principle missions for the Chinese navy:
"1) Securing sea control in the major battle directions in China's offshore waters;
2) Blockading major SLOCs effectively and within a required span of time in the
waters encompassing China's maritime territories;
3) Initiating major sea battles in waters adjacent to China's maritime territories;
and
4) Waging reliable nuclear retaliatory strikes" (Ji 1999, 169).
These mission sets require a much larger and capable navy than the brown water coastal
adjunct to the PLA envisioned by the Mao and Admiral Xiao. The PLAN's resulting
robust growth over the last few years has rapidly expanded its surface, submarine, and
land-based naval aviation platforms.63
62 "Identifying and exploiting assymetries is a fundamental aspect of Chinese strategic and military
thinking, particularly as a means for a weaker force to defeat one that is stronger...A 1999 Liberation Army
Daily editorial suggested that explicitly: 'a strong enemy with absolute superiority is certainly not without
weakness that can be exploited by a weaker side... [O]ur military preparations need to be more directly
aimed at finding tactics to exploit the weakness of a strong enemy"' (CMP 2007, 13).
63 China's naval forces currently include 72 principal combatants, 58 attack submarines, around 50 medium
and heavy amphibious lift vessels, and approximately 41 coastal missile patrol craft. (CMP 2007, 3).
As part of the Offshore Defense strategy, the PLAN has developed doctrine
focusing on the disruption of SLOCs. The PLAN, in its Textbook for Naval Campaign
Theory, "has formulated a number of principles:
1. Because of the Navy's limited offensive capabilities, it should launch selective attacks on the
enemy's priority SLOCs, which can either be in deep oceans or its inshore seas.
2. In order to avoid the enemy's intensified anti-attack, the choice of targets and employment of
PLAN units should be dispersed. At the same time concentration of major combatants should be
supplemented by small-scale disruptive activities in the whole process of the campaign.
3. Because the PLAN is still a light type navy and its normal radius of action is limited, anti-
SLOCs campaigns should be mainly conducted within the scope of 'green water.' This may make it
possible for the campaign to be supported by the land-based air power of the air force.
4. Due to lack of sufficient numbers of major combatants, there should be a carefully planned
limit for targets. There should be restrictions on the times of using main attack units.
5. Anti-SLOCs campaign should include an attack on the enemy's ports (Ji 1999, 182)64
The defensive nature of the language used to elaborate these principles shows that they
are probably not intended as guidance against a near peer or lesser naval power, but most
likely at a naval power with substantially superior forces and capabilities. In Asia, only
the United States and Japan currently fit that description. These principles explicitly call
attention to some of the technological and material deficiencies present within the PLAN
and implicitly express a desire to increase China's maritime capabilities and reach. At
face value, the principles seem to provide guidance for an anti-SLOC campaign against a
greater naval power, but they could easily be applied in a cross strait scenario with
64 AS a doctrine driven culture and organization, the PLAN's operational plans could be expected to adhere
to these principles to the maximum extent possible.
Taiwan, especially in containing or limiting the response options of an interfering naval
force.
VI. PLAN FORCE STRUCTURE MODELS
This section presents three potential future force structure options for the PLAN.
As stated previously, China is at a crossroads and it will therefore have to make choices
that will likely shape the PLAN toward one of three force structure models over the next
5-15 years. Since the PRC, and the PLA more specifically, remain relatively obtuse in
elaborating priorities and intentions, the following models and the type of maritime
strategy that they represent might serve as an indication of how China's perceives its
challenges, threats, and opportunities in the upcoming century.
China's increasing maritime interests translate into a dynamic set of seaborne
tasks within a varied set of scenarios that the PLAN might eventually be asked to
accomplish. The models draw upon the relationships that should exist between China's
maritime interests, economic and political-military limitations, theoretical application of
sea power, and expressed doctrine and maritime strategy. These models do not exist in a
vacuum, and many of the capabilities required in each model have utility across a broad
range of maritime activities. Therefore, it I do not suggest that a maritime force structure
tailored toward one type of maritime strategy precludes pursuit of another type of
maritime strategy, but only that force structure decisions optimized for a particular
strategy would likely develop along the models presented.
I develop each model by describing the envisioned scenario that it might be
designed to operate within, the primary maritime interests that each model seeks to
influence, the general capabilities required to formulate the force structure, the specific
technological or economic limitations to creating that force structure, and whether or not
it supports elaborated doctrine and strategy. These three different force structures reflect
a set of positive decisions that PLAN policy makers might undertake in order to protect a
specific and limited set of vital maritime interests.
It is important to remember that force structure decisions (even in the United
States) are a series of capability tradeoffs. Although overall budget increases might be
applied broadly across the full range of potential PLAN activities, resources allocations
more often pinpoint specific areas to improve specific capabilities, leaving others either
unchanged or only marginally more effective. 65 Some capabilities may better enable a
certain type of strategy that is best suited to protect a specific set of interests. Policy
makers must take force structure into account when making choices as to which interests
are vital and which are not. This logic applies to the PRC as well. Any realistic model of
future PLAN force structure, without unforeseen and considerably unrealistic increases in
military spending, must take into account the real constraints and restraints facing the
Chinese. Considering the limitations presented earlier in this paper, China has neither the
technological capability nor the financial freedom to develop a carbon copy of the United
States Navy.66 By no means do I assume that these force structure models are the only
avenue for the future PLAN force structure decisions, only that they represent the most
pragmatic and logical approach to protecting China's maritime interests.
65 This trade off does not mean that because certain capabilities are more apropos to one scenario or
envisioned use of the that they are not useful or advantageous to another.
66 The force structure options presented reflect increased capabilities that will improve the PLAN in certain
naval warfare areas, while acknowledging its limits in others. Therefore, every force structure option is
something less than a full-spectrum blue water navy. For the next 20-30 years, the PLAN will have to
pragmatically focus upon core mission areas that correlate with a select few of their perceived vital
interests or risk being a jack-of-all-trades and the master of none.
A. MODEL I: THE "UNIFICATION" MODEL
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Table 1: Characteristics of the "Unification" Model
1) What is a "Unification" Navy?
A "Unification" Navy is a PLAN specifically tailored to provide a dominant
maritime component to any Chinese coercive military effort against Taiwan while
simultaneously deterring any potential interference from outside powers in the event of
PRC military action against Taiwan.6 7  In other words, the "unification"' PLAN is a
navy capable of regional sea denial. A "unification" PLAN must credibly threaten to
inflict enough damage on U.S. warships (especially aircraft carriers) to force the U.S. to
re-evaluate the cost-benefit relationship of defending Taiwan against forcible
reunification. A true sea denial capability would prevent use of the contested area by any
of the opponent's ships. However, the most likely type of anti-access or sea denial
67 The actual methods China may use in a military attack are numerous. The Taiwanese Ministry of
Defense lists three likely types of warfare the PRC might use against Taiwan: Intimidation Warfare,
Paralysis Warfare, and Invasion Warfare. Within each warfare type are specific operations that the PRC
might utilize to force Taiwanese capitulation. (Republic of China Ministry of Defense 2006; hereafter
NDR).
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envisioned by the PLAN would be to create a scenario that would force the USN to spend
great amounts of time (many days, if not weeks) to sanitize its operating area prior to
sending in its capital ships. In the meantime, the Chinese would try to rapidly force
Taiwan's capitulation or a negotiated settlement, relegating any potential U.S. response
an ineffectual afterthought. A unification navy would seek to control the immediate
operational area in the Taiwan Strait, dominate any force on force encounters with the
Taiwanese navy, and provide the maritime component to any joint PLA operation to
force Taiwan's capitulation. However, since the PLAN's most important mission in this
scenario would be to stem or delay any potential U.S. interference by increasing the costs
of intervention to an unacceptable level, I will focus the discussion here.
2) Chinese National Interests Supported by a "Unification" Navy?
a) Increased Coercive Leverage Against Taiwan
Taiwan remains a central issue in the domestic political considerations of
the Communist regime. A credible military component to any coercive effort to unite
Taiwan with the mainland is the scenario envisioned by a "unification" navy. Although
increasing coercive pressure against Taiwan is a factor in all of the models presented in
this paper, the "unification" model focuses specifically on preventing interference of an
outside power by developing a force structure that supports a regional anti-access
strategy. Officially, any possibility of Taiwan's "'de jure independence'...pos[es] a grave
threat to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as to peace and stability
across the Taiwan Straits and in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole" (CND 2006).
China's interests with respect to Taiwan are political and very specific.68 The CCP has
68 The PRC maintains that Taiwan remains part an integral (although de facto independent) part of the
Chinese nation, and treats it as a rogue province. China maintains the right to solve the "Taiwan question"
staked much of its legitimacy in projecting itself as the defender of Chinese sovereignty
(especially defending against the threat created by the potential de jure independence of
Taiwan). Accordingly, weakness in the face of Taiwanese independence might weaken
the entire regime. China certainly has considerable economic and diplomatic interests
with respect to Taiwan, but the vast importance placed on recovering Taiwan by the PRC
(and the fact that it reserves the right to use force to ensure that Taiwan does not achieve
de jure independence) marginalizes most economic or diplomatic interests by intimating
that the PRC is willing to damage significant portions of the Taiwanese economy in a
unification effort.
b) Enhanced Territorial Control within the Marginal Seas
An effective anti-access force capable of limiting U.S. involvement in the
marginal seas would also find utility against any other regional naval force. The ability
to selectively deny access to other nations limits them from establishing presence on
disputed territory and, if presence is already established, provides the PLAN with a
capability to prevent resupply or reinforcement. This capability enhances China's
coercive lever not only with Taiwan, but also vis-a-vis regional competitors.
by force. In March 2005, the National People's Congress passed the Anti-Secession Law authorizing the
military to adopt non-peaceful and other necessary measures to resolve the Taiwan issue under specific
conditions. (NDR 2006). The anti-secession law attempts to justify military and non-military measures to
resolving the Taiwan issue by creating a domestic legal justification from which China could theoretically
act if provoked. This law illustrates the range of coercive measures (often non-military) that China
employs against Taiwan and is important to this discussion due to its contribution to the PRC's cumulative
coercive information operation campaign. The most critical aspect of China's coercive effort remains the
threat of military force.
3) Primary Force Structure Requirements 69
In 1996, the United States could see and shoot further than the Chinese. Chinese
military impotence with respect to American naval power resulted from its inability to
accurately locate and track U.S. naval forces, most importantly, the inability of Chinese
weapons platforms to challenge U.S. naval forces operating in the Philippine Sea.
Supported by a network of advanced, integrated of sensors, the U.S. Navy could
accurately detect, locate, track, and engage Chinese targets both inside and outside of the
strait at a range well beyond anything the Chinese were capable. 70 Furthermore, U.S.
weapon systems, which include aircraft, Tomahawk land attack missiles, and long range
SM-2 SAMs, could all either reach out to the mainland or completely cover Taiwan with
little chance of interference by the Chinese. Had U.S. forces operated within the Strait, it
would have significantly simplified the targeting and attack solutions for the Chinese, but
not significantly added to the U.S. capability to strike at Chinese targets operating in or
near the Strait. This incongruity between the American and Chinese operational
capabilities denied the PLAN the ability to deploy a truly capable and credible regional
sea denial capability.
Especially in naval warfare, advantage often goes to the side that can find the
enemy sooner and attack him at the greater range. Inside of the Taiwan Strait, the
69 Force structure in this paper is defined not as the specific numbers and types of individual weapon
systems. It is intended to define a broad overview of the types of competency that the PLAN will need to
master in order to successfully implement the envisioned maritime strategy.
70 While some systems that contribute to the U.S. surveillance capabilities remain classified, broadly
described they include constellations of satellites and aircraft capable of electronic signals (ELINT), signals
intelligence (SIGINT), and other sensors capable of radar, infrared, and acoustic data collection. When
these sensors are brought together in an integrated system, they can provide targeting and cueing
information to the actual "shooters." For example, an advantage of this type of integration is that it may
allow one Aegis ship to fire a weapon at a target with information received from another ship in a different
location. A simpler operational example might have a PLAN submarine operating independently in the
Philippine Sea that would float a communications buoy and receive cueing information consisting of
location and tracks of U.S. ships in the area.
Chinese employs an impressive surveillance and weapons capability. Outside of the
Strait, China lacked wide area surveillance capability to find U.S. targets and an effective
OTH weapon system capable of conducting concentrated attacks on them once located.7
A wide-area surveillance system would provide two things to the Chinese: an effective
early warning of approaching naval and air forces and the means with which to direct
Chinese forces to the enemy.72
The tactical significance of development of a regional OTH wide-area
surveillance capability is profound, and this capability would need to be integrated with
weapons capable of attacking from over the horizon. Because the PLAN currently
utilizes the very platforms that it would engage the enemy with to find enemy ships and
aircraft in the region, PLAN assets need to approach enemy ships or aircraft to within
their sensors' detection range in order to locate them. Of course, this leaves them
vulnerable to attack. A famous military axiom states, "If you can see the enemy, he can
see you." This holds particularly true in the surface maritime domain. If the PLAN's
ships, aircraft, and submarines could receive off-platform cueing information, it would
71 For example, the Russian designed SU-300PMU2 advanced surface to air missile (SAM) system armed
with SA-20 SAMs can cover the entire strait and parts of northwest Taiwan. The CSS-6 SRBM is capable
of a coverage area 300km beyond Taiwan, but this system is virtually useless as an anti-ship weapon,
because it has no terminal guidance and its circular error probable (CEP) is measured in hundreds of yards
not feet. Furthermore, any aircraft launched from the mainland against U.S. ships would have to pass
Taiwanese air defenses (both ROCAF combat air patrols and SAM batteries), USN combat air patrols, and
USN Aegis anti-air area defense ships. For the official U.S. Department of Defense cross-strait balance of
forces, see (CMP 2007).
72 The importance of early warning is obvious to even the most untrained of military strategists, so its effect
on Chinese development of a regional sea-denial navy will not be addressed. However, the importance of
an over the horizon targeting system may not be obvious to the casual observer. The PLAN has acquired
an impressive array of advanced, long-range anti-ship cruise missiles for its ships, submarines and aircraft.
Unfortunately, in order to fire these weapons from long ranges, a weapons platform (be it ship, aircraft, or
submarine) must have some idea of where the enemy is before launching its weapons. Currently, these
platforms are constrained by their own internal (or organic) systems that often limit the platform to the
sensor's line of sight in the case of electro-magnetic or visual systems. Acoustic systems (such as sonar
found on submarines) can detect and identify targets at some extremely long ranges, but if only one sensor
is used they generally give only a bearing to a target, which makes it difficult to provide accurate targeting
information to an anti-ship weapon.
greatly increase their effectiveness and reduce their vulnerability. With effective
targeting and cueing, they could venture from protected coastal bastions only after hostile
forces have been detected, located and classified. In this way, the PLAN's weapons
platforms could be vectored directly to an over the horizon weapon's release point to
engage their targets. This reduces the likelihood of counter detection, makes it difficult to
counter-attack if detected, and does not stress the relatively short endurance of the
PLAN's diesel-electric submarines and ASCM armed SU-30MKK aircraft. Additionally,
once PLAN forces have engaged the enemy, they can withdrawal to their better-protected
coastal bastions to fight another day.
In order to build a true anti-access capability for the East and South China Seas,
the PLAN must first improve both its long-range, persistent wide-area surveillance
capability and its ability to strike moving, defended targets beyond Taiwan. These inter-
related capabilities are a pre-requisite for any anti-access strategy the PLAN may develop
with respect to Taiwan and may provide indications that China is developing a credible
regional sea-denial navy that poses a credible threat beyond the coastal confines of the
Taiwan Strait.73
a) Over the Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) Radar
Effective wide-area surveillance for the approaches to Taiwan requires
that any Chinese surveillance system have a range great enough to cover the required
area, a sensitivity great enough to detect stealthy ships and aircraft, and a dwell time long
73 The "Unification" Navy is unique among the three models, because of its reliance upon a multi-service
approach. In this model, the PLAN might play a critical role in accomplishing wide-area surveillance and
OTH attacks, but the PLAAF and the Second Artillery would play equally important and complimentary
roles.
enough to provide persistent coverage. 74  Several different types of systems might
provide an answer to this capability gap, including various ELINT, radar, or imaging
satellites and various advanced UAV-type systems. Unfortunately, the costs associated
with research, development, and deployment of such systems might quickly balloon
China's defense budget.75  Fielding of advanced high frequency over-the-horizon
backscatter (OTH-B) radars seems the most plausible, affordable, and technologically
accessible solution to the China's wide area surveillance problem might.
Due to their ability to detect targets in excess of 3000km, OTH-B radars have
been in operation in many countries, including the PRC, since the 1970s to detect and
provide warning of missile launches.76 Further refinement and may make increase their
ability to allow near real time and persistent surveillance over vast areas of the China and
Philippine Sea. Still another indication of Chinese attempts to create a persistent wide
area surveillance capability might be the deployment of a constellation of low earth orbit
(LEO) ELINT satellites that can provide cueing for additional LEO imaging satellites
throughout the South and East China Seas and the Philippine Sea.77 Unfortunately, LOE
74 Wide-area surveillance systems would probably not be specifically allocated or controlled by the PLAN,
but would necessarily provide targeting and cueing information to PLAN weapon systems.
75 Although the numbers and types of U.S. space based systems and their costs are often classified, the total
amount of money the U.S. spends on military research and development is not. The U.S. has allocated $32
billion to R&D in the 2008 defense budget (U.S. DoD 2007b). When compared to the even the highest
U.S. DOD's estimates of the PLA's budget, that amount would represent fully one fifth of the total PLA
budget. The U.S. does acknowledge that China is attempting to increase its space-based surveillance
systems, and that the PRC places a large importance on them (CMP 2007, 27, 42).
76 OTH-B radars gain greatly increased ranges over traditional line-of-sight radars by bouncing HF radio
waves off of the ionosphere. Also, the long wavelengths associated with high frequency reportedly provide
increased detection against stealthy ships and aircraft. OTH-B radars generally consist of huge fixed
receiving and transmitting antennas arrays that can be separated by 100 miles or more (FAS 1999).
77 Although the details of U.S. ELINT satellites as targeting and wide area surveillance systems remains
highly classified, Russian military journals have reported on the existence and probable use of these
systems. "The US Navy's space borne electronic intelligence (ELINT) system, White Cloud, is based on
SSU (Sub-satellite Unit) satellites and is intended for determining the location of warships of foreign states
and following them by the method of taking bearings on the ships' onboard radio electronic equipment from
several positions. Official Pentagon representatives try not to attract attention to this system, since it is the
principal means of over-the-horizon reconnaissance and target designation for the US Navy's weapons
prevents persistent coverage, leaving significant gaps in coverage, and the development
and actual construction costs of developing satellite networks capable of accurate
targeting and cueing information may prove prohibitive for the Chinese. Advanced
OTH-B radars may provide the most likely avenue for a Chinese attempt to develop a
wide area surveillance capability due to its more economical costs, technologically
feasibility, persistent coverage and operational effectiveness than a satellite-based
system, and may serve as an indicator of China's commitment to the "Unification"
model.78
b) Theater Ballistic Missiles with Maneuverable Re-Entry Vehicles
(MaR Vs)
The Chinese already have a substantial and growing number of short and
medium range ballistic missiles (SRBM/MRBM) deployed in Fujian Province across the
Strait from Taiwan. Current ballistic missiles technologically reliable and relatively
inexpensive to produce. Difficult to intercept once launched, these PLA's SRBMs create
a difficult challenge for any forces trying to defend Taiwan. 79 In order to close the loop
on a truly anti-access regional capability, the Chinese might try to develop and deploy
ballistic missiles that can be terminally guided to their targets once those targets have
systems...The task of determining the bearings of naval targets is made easier by the fact that practically all
ships have continually operating emitters fulfilling various purposes: communications, navigation, surface
and air search, and weapons control" (Andronov 1993, 57-60).
78 The U.S. built and fielded its AN/FPS-1 18 OTH-B radar for a cost of $1.5 billion. A paper by the
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration estimates the costs of modem military OTH
radars at approximately $100 million. This relatively limited cost and the fact that Russia, France, and
Australia all have deployed OTH radars makes this option both accessible and more affordable to the
Chinese than much more expensive and technologically difficult spaced based satellite wide-area
surveillance systems (Georges and Harlan 1999).
79 Interestingly enough, when well-concealed on mobile launchers, they are also very difficult to destroy
before launch. Coalition forces in the Persian Gulf War expended considerable effort to find and destroy
Iraqi Scud missiles, with only little success. Even with Coalition forces enjoying air supremacy, the Iraqis
were still able to launch Scud throughout the conflict against Saudi Arabia and Israel. For a more complete
discussion on the difficulty of finding Iraqi Scuds (Rosneau 2001, ch. 3).
been detected, located, and classified by the wide-area surveillance system. These
weapons would probably be only feasible at ranges envisioned in a regional scenario
however. 80
In response to a global proliferation of ballistic missiles, the United States has
invested extraordinary amounts of time and money toward researching and developing a
deployable theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) capability for both ships (through
upgrades to the Aegis combat system) and shore-based infrastructure (with upgrades to
the Patriot, PAC-3 air defense missile system.) Though Chinese SRBMs are a
formidable threat to bombard Taiwanese infrastructure, they are virtually useless as
precision weapons against moving targets, especially ships at sea. The weapons will land
only where initially aimed. Furthermore, the accuracy of these missiles is often measured
in hundreds of yards, which is relatively ineffectual to target a warship. Therefore,
without further advancement in current SRBM guidance systems, theses missiles do not
directly contribute to a PLAN mission of regional sea-denial. Developing a terminally
guided ballistic missile capability would indeed provide China with a balance altering
capability, but the technology required to deploy this type of system does not currently
exist; therefore, the eventual deployment of such a system is greatly problematical and
may not be technologically feasible or affordable within Chinese budgetary constraints.
80 As range increases, so does the time between missile launch and terminal flight. In a regional scenariom
short flight times between launch and target acquisition, would mean a moving target would not have
moved as far from the initial acquisition point. The longer the missile flight time, the farther away a
moving target would be from the initial targeting point. This might limit usefulness of this technology on
a global or hemispheric scale. For example, if the time to reach the target from acquisition to impact is as
little as 15 minutes, a ship moving at just 20 kts would be 5 NM away from the aim point.
4) On the Right Track? Pieces in Place to Build a "Unification" Navy
Several factors might influence Chinese leadership to pursue the force structure
required to implement this maritime strategy. First, the cost associated with producing
this type of Navy is the least of any of the models presented in this paper, an important
factor with those who hold the PLA's purse strings. Second, there are many pieces
already in place that would contribute to the strategy. While systems such as MaRVs
would solidify China's dominance in the region, they are not necessary to achieve a
credible anti-access capability; they are the "gold-plated" solution. Formidable,
"traditional," and relatively inexpensive weapon and command and control systems are
easily obtainable. They can and do require nations such as the U.S. to think twice about
interfering in a cross-strait military confrontation and develop counter-responses. Third,
this strategy is the most feasible for the experience level, skill sets, weapon systems, and
doctrine currently in place throughout the PLAN. Considering these factors, it seems
likely that, at a minimum, the PLAN will continue to pursue a regional sea-denial
capability.
The U.S. Department of Defense refers to "disruptive capabilities" when defining
anti-access capabilities. These disruptive capabilities are further defined as "forces or
operational concepts aimed at preventing an adversary from deploying military forces to
forward operating areas, and/or rapidly destabilizing critical military balances" (CMP
2007, 15-16). While the China may be a long way from deploying MaRVs in
conjunction with a wide-area surveillance system, the PLAN currently has some of the
critical capabilities it would need to cause significant disruption as an anti-access force.
a) Conventional Submarines with OTHASCMs
The PLAN seems likely to continue its acquisition of modem and quiet
diesel electric submarines capable of firing advanced anti-ship cruise missiles from
standoff ranges. Conventional submarines (SSKs) possess less range and significantly
less submerged endurance than nuclear attack submarines (SSNs,) but when operating
submerged on batteries they produce a significantly quieter acoustic signature. In a
regional anti-access scenario, their limited range would not be a factor and their low
overall submerged acoustic signature, coupled with the difficult acoustic environment of
the water space around Taiwan, means that even the most advanced U.S. acoustic sensors
find it very difficult to detect and locate these submarines.
The PLAN's continued construction and purchase of submarines, especially
diesel-electric submarines has been the source of much discussion in American defense
circles. The conventional submarine threat provides the greatest short-term threat to
surface forces operating inside of the first and second island chains. When armed with
long-range ASCMs, these submarines pose a very credible threat. If provided with
accurate cueing and targeting information, several of these already difficult to detect
submarines could remain at a standoff range (intensifying the detection problem), fire
their weapons on a multi-axis attack, and then evade response while inflicting the desired
"disruptive" effects.
The PLAN's diesel electric submarines have the range and endurance to reach the
U.S. battle groups' operating areas in the Philippine Sea, but the training and experience
levels of the crews will need serious improvements. During the 1996 Taiwan crisis, a
national security council staffer reported that no PLAN forces operated to the east of
Taiwan and no PLAN submarine even came close to any U.S. ships. 8 1 One DoD report
obtained by the Federation of American Scientists shows that the PLAN had only
conducted an average of 2.4 submarine patrols per year between 2002-2006.82 FAS goes
on to say that "the implications of the low patrol rate are significant. The total operational
experience for the entire Chinese submarine force is only 49 patrols in 25 years,
corresponding to each submarine conducting an average of one patrol every third
year...As a result, Chinese submarine crews appear to have relatively little operational
experience and consequently limited skills in operating their boats safely and
competently. It suggests that the tactical skills that would be needed for the Chinese
submarine force to operate effectively in a war may be limited" (FAS 2007).
b) Mine Warfare (MIW) 83
China's mine inventory and the numerous platforms capable of delivering
mines provide important tools for PLAN regional anti-access strategy. Although they
would be significantly less effective in the deeper water east of Taiwan where U.S. naval
forces would most likely operate, mines might be utilized to great effectiveness to seal
off the Taiwan Strait and the main harbors of Taiwan itself. Mines in a Taiwan scenario
would not necessarily limit the participation of U.S. surface forces, (should these forces
operate in the deeper waters east of Taiwan) but might hinder or limit U.S. submarines
81 For an account of no PLAN ships or submarines approaching U.S. vessels during the 1996 Taiwan Strait
crisis, see (Suettinger 2003, 260). For a report on the actual numbers of patrols undertaken by PLAN
submarines between 1981 and 2006, see (O'Rourke 2007, 25). The average number of patrols reported for
PLAN submarines conducted each year between 2001-2005 averages only 2.5. This extraordinarily small
number of patrols strongly implies that the Chinese have a very inexperienced and untested submarine
force. In 1996, there was only one reported submarine patrol, which means it is likely that the PLAN did
not sortie even one submarine in response to the U.S. presence during the Taiwan Strait crisis.
82 "China continues - at least for now - to use its submarine force as a coastal defense force. This type of
sortie suggests an extremely inexperienced submarine force" (FAS 2007).
83 This discussion on mine warfare in a Taiwan scenario draws heavily from (Glosny 2004).
from operating areas in or near the Taiwan Strait. Furthermore mine fields sewn near
Taiwanese ports would most likely hinder any seaborne re-supply effort of Taiwan.
5) Trade-Offs
The "unification" model allows the PLAN to maximize its coercive lever upon
Taiwan by limiting the potential effects from outside interference, but reduces the
PLAN's overall ability to affect events much beyond the first or second island chain.
Politically, this force structure/strategy model would continue to focus Chinese efforts on
unifying Taiwan with the mainland, but would also have increasing utility in China's
South Sea territorial claims by ensuring that no other regional power could realistically
challenge China in its marginal seas.
Operationally and materially, this model is the easiest for the PLAN to
implement. This model fits best into the limited experience level and current operational
capabilities of the PLAN, and its reliance on relatively inexpensive and easy to obtain
conventional submarines equipped with modem ASCMs would not overly tax an already
constrained PLA budget. China has acquired many of the OTH weapons, especially
ASCMs that it would need to implement this strategy and the distances involved in a
regional scenario would fit well into the PLAN's traditional "coastal defense" approach
to its naval forces. 84 Unfortunately, this type of navy would not provide China with an
ability to credibly defend its distant SLOCs, and would be ill equipped to respond in the
Strait of Malacca or the Indian Ocean.
84 Obviously, the research and development cost of creating the MaRV technology mentioned earlier would
entail large capital expenditures, and the technology may not even be feasible in the end. However, should
China actually develop or threaten to develop a deployable MaRV, the output measure of sea power created
by that technology would most likely propel China to unquestionably become the region's dominant naval
power.
B. MODEL II: THE "INFLUENCE PROJECTION" NAVY
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Table 2: Characteristics of the "Influence Projection" Model
1) What is an "Influence Projection" Navy
An influence projection navy would serve to protect China's growing economic
interests overseas, its territorial ambitions closer to home and provide China's with a
powerful symbolic tool to portray national strength. This type of navy is not often
discussed in the literature concerning Chinese naval development.8 5 Designed to project
influence as much as power, it would provide a prestige force that could serve as a "hard
power road show," complementing and re-enforcing China's growing soft power and
economic development campaigns around the world. This model creates the opportunity
for the PLAN to develop a wide range of capabilities to support most of the missions on
the warfare continuum. An "influence projection" navy might be modeled to perform
disaster relief and non-combatant evacuation against little opposition to conflict with peer
85 Although the possibility of Chinese development of aircraft carriers has received much interest,
observers have often characterized carrier development as a direct challenge to the U.S. Navy. For a
discussion on the challenges and implications of Chinese carrier development, see (Storey and Ji, 2004).
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naval powers. Although the "influence projection" navy might add moderate worldwide
response capability to hostile actions against Chinese economic and political interests (a
capability currently lacking in the Chinese foreign policy playbook), it could also add
significantly increased potential for China to contribute positively to regional collective
maritime security measures. Built to display the most visible and visceral elements of
naval power, an influence projection navy might consist of two or three task groups that
could cruise not only China's marginal seas, but also anywhere China desired to show its
flag.
When discussing the possibility of China's acquisition of naval aviation or a
"blue-water" capability, many observers consider that eventuality a direct threat to U.S.
naval dominance. This type of navy is not a blue-water counterforce to the United States
Navy, but would perhaps more closely resemble either a French or Royal Navy strike
group model with task forces organized around a light aircraft carrier or amphibious
assault ship (helicopter carrier). Compared to most other nations' naval capabilities, this
force would present a credible deterrent, but would not have the range, endurance, or
power projection capabilities of a U.S. carrier strike group. An Influence Navy would
not challenge the United States, but serve to bolster specific Chinese overseas interests.
An influence projection PLAN would provide a visible force that contributes to Chinese
foreign policy by being a considerable diplomatic tool that gives China a limited measure
of sea control over minor or near peer naval powers away from China's marginal seas for
a limited period of time.
2) Chinese Interests Supported by a "Influence Projection" Navy
a) Defense of Chinese Interests Abroad
China's growing reliance upon overseas and offshore resources and
markets places considerable pressure on the PRC to ensure not only continued access to
the oceans' highways, but to defend its considerable investments abroad. The predictably
unstable nature of the developing countries has allowed China to re-define how resources
importing nations receive concessions from resource exporting nations. Western nations,
the United States in particular have generally given aid with caveats that require the
receiving nation to show results in promoting good governance and fiscal accountability.
China's largess is often free of such encumbrances, with the Chinese often providing
large capital expenditures with little political or fiscal accountability required of the
receiver nation. This has allowed China to rapidly acquire oil and mineral concessions,
but exacerbates the instability that often already exists in resource rich and poorly
governed nations.
Recent kidnappings of Chinese nationals and attacks on China's energy
development infrastructure in Nigeria, Niger, and Ethiopia may push China toward
developing a military response option to deter further assaults on its overseas interests.86
These incidents are often undertaken amidst the internal instability of developing nations,
resulting in extortion and further disruption that ultimately could be very damaging to
continued Chinese presence and economic efficiency. Without the military response
option that an influence projection navy could create, China remains virtually incapable
of directly protecting its interests and of protecting its citizens abroad.
86 See, Heavens, Andrew and Tsegaye Tadesse, "Ethiopia Rebels Want to Hand Over Chinese Hostages,"
Reuters, 26 April 2007; Vogt, Heidi, "Nigerian Rebels: Chinese Hostages to be Freed Immediately,"
International Herald Tribune, 11 July 2007.
b) Increased International Prestige
Closely connected with China's ability to defend its national interests
abroad is its desire to be accepted into the company of great nations. An influence
projection navy would also serve as a prestige tool to reflect China's rise as a great power
and its arrival upon the world scene. It might also provide China with a tool to positively
provide disaster relief services, SLOC security, and consequence management functions.
Jiang Zhijun, director of the Chinese Naval Research Institute of the PLAN has stated, "A
strong navy will raise a country's prestige in the world and increase a country's influence
and the credibility in the international arena. It would give the other countries a stronger
sense of assurance when they deal with China, and therefore, it would benefit China's sea
routes, foreign trade and investment prospects.""87 This comment is suggestive of how
China sees naval influence as a value added accoutrement for a great power that could
ease acceptance into the great power club.
c) Enhanced Territorial Control within the Marginal Seas
Within China's marginal seas, an influence navy based on visible and
relatively powerful task forces with organic air capability might prove extremely
important in solidifying Chinese claims to territories and EEZs throughout the South and
East China Sea. As discussed previously, China's claims to the entire South China Sea
basin stem from both territorial desire to make the South China Sea a "Chinese Lake" and
also from China's hope that it may provide critical offshore energy resources that may
offset its reliance on foreign sources of energy. An influence projection force that is
capable of steaming to Africa would also be capable of relatively persistent patrols in the
South and East China Seas. With the added benefit of air superiority, the PLAN could
87 People's Liberation Daily, "China's Worries at Sea," 02 January 2004.
exert a formidable measure of sea control over the areas surrounding the disputed islands,
potentially providing a de facto sovereignty over them.
3) Primary Force Structure Requirements
a) Naval Aviation 88
Although nuclear missile submarines may have more total power and quiet
nuclear attack submarines may prove more survivable and deadly to carriers, aircraft
carriers possess a unique symbolism that signifies national power. Admiral Yao, the first
president of the Guangzhou naval academy has stated, "Since the Second World War,
aircraft carriers as the symbols of a country's important deterrent power have been
accorded more attention" (Storey and Ji 2004). The most visible (and controversial)
component of an influence projection navy requires acquisition of some form of carrier-
based aviation.
Unfortunately, in developing carrier aviation, the PLAN will have to start from
scratch. The Chinese industrial base has shown difficulty in providing the types of
innovation required to tackle the systems integration and complex development problems
associated with creating large naval systems. 89 Although there is little likelihood of the
PLAN developing U.S. fleet type carriers, this type of navy provides the PLAN with an
opportunity to walk before it runs. A helicopter carrier, for example, would provide the
PLAN with a capability of projecting limited forces ashore away from China's traditional
88 Currently, the PLAN Air Force (PLANAF) does not seem to be emulating the Soviet naval aviation
model. The Soviets focused on long-range strategic bombers carrying ASCMs to counter US carrier battle
groups and NATO's SLOCs, in order to affect a strategic element to their naval aviation strategy. The
PLANAF has acquired a number of Russian ASCM capable Su-30's. If capability is seen as a measure of
political intent, these relatively short range aircraft seem to validate a regional focus to China's maritime
strategy.
89 China's usually relies on foreign acquisition as its recourse to lack of capability within its own military
industrial complex. Unfortunately, China's main technological supplier, Russia, has only limited
experience in building aircraft carriers and is likely to provide technological assistance only if China builds
a carrier in a Russian shipyard.
areas and also provide them the opportunity to "practice" aggregated fleet operations.
This is important because, even a light type of carrier envisioned in this model, the PLAN
would be able to reach beyond the coastal confines that currently restrict its naval
aviation forces and exert both a symbolic measure of prestige to China as a whole and
add a measure of real hard power to China's political and diplomatic efforts around the
world.
b) Improved ASW, Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), and Airborne Early
Warning (AEW) Assets, Doctrine, and Proficiency
In order to successfully defend any naval task force away from the coastal
bastions that generally protect the current PLAN, the PLAN would need to develop and
establish greatly improved fleet ASW, AAW, and AEW assets, proficiency, and doctrine.
The Chinese tend to look at U.S. aircraft carriers as both the greatest strength and the
"Achilles heel" of the U.S. Navy. Although incredibly powerful and symbolically
important; the PLAN views American aircraft carriers as vulnerable to submarines and
air attack from cruise missiles. Additionally, they require a large (and expensive)
accompaniment of specialized aircraft and ships to protect them. For example, a U.S.
carrier strike group normally deploys with between three to six fleet air defense ships and
at least one dedicated logistics ship (to provide fuel, food, and ammunition for the strike
group.) This would require the PLAN to develop and deploy a fleet of up to 18 advanced
AAW defense ships, a considerable investment.
The Chinese have often stated that they would utilize asymmetric attacks
(primarily interpreted to mean submarine-launched ASCM attacks) to disrupt or destroy
U.S. carrier operations. With few aircraft or surface ships equipped with advanced
acoustic sensors, Chinese ships, themselves, are vulnerable to submarines. ASW
capability has been characterized as "the most serious deficiency" plaguing the PLAN.
Should the PLAN submarine force's lack of proficiency serve any indication, the PLAN
surface force is almost certainly out of practice and perhaps completely incapable of
integrated ASW.90 The major irony of following this model for the PLAN would mean
that the PLAN would also become vulnerable to a lesser power with an asymmetric
submarine threat. India, Pakistan, Australia, Indonesia, Iran, and Russia all have
submarine forces that could threaten a PLAN carrier task force.
At the same time that a carrier task force's ships might defend the carrier from the
submarine threat, they must also warn of incoming air threat or guide the carrier's aircraft
to defend against those threats (AEW) or actually shoot down and defend against those
airborne threats (AAW). China is clearly trying to develop an area defense AAW
defense capability with the construction of five new destroyer classes with an emphasis
on fleet-defense AAW capability, but their effectiveness is still questioned. 91 Even if the
PLAN desired to pursue an influence type navy without actual aircraft carriers, the PLAN
would need to address and correct the deficiencies in these critical skills.
90 Since navies often practice ASW on their own submarines, the fact that the PLAN's submarines have so
rarely put to sea in the past fifteen years is probably a good indicator of the proficiency level of the rest of
the PLAN's ASW forces.
91 Area defense means that one ship can protect multiple ships. Point defense, means that a ship is merely
capable of defending itself, not others. Creating ships with area defense capabilities will be a pre-requisite
for any nominal PLAN strike group to deploy away from the cover currently provided by mainland China's
integrated air defense networks. The Luzhou class destroyer is armed with the Russian SS-N-20 SAM
system and the TOMBSTONE phased array radar system. This represents a considerable improvement
over the older Luda class destroyers that had virtually no AAW capabilities. "The PLAN surface fleet,
however, still lacks 'modem air surveillance systems and data links required for area defense missions.
The combination of short-range weapons and lack of modem surveillance systems limits the PLAN to self-
defense and point defense [AAW] only. As a result, except in unusual circumstances, no PLAN ship is
capable of conducting air defense of anther ship"' (O'Rourke 2007, 27).
c) Global Command and Control (C) Infrastructure
Secure communications and data transmit capability represent another
critical capability requirement for deploying naval forces on a global scale. Satellites,
data links, and other communication services will need to be acquired or developed that
allow for effective relay of information from the forces at sea (or engaged with an
opponent) to the national command authority or vice versa. On the most tactical level,
PLAN forces will need to identify friendly and hostile targets, pass position information,
and communicate with each other. However, at every level of warfare, strategic,
operational, and tactical, command and control infrastructure is a large investment and
will remain a technologically difficult challenge to implementing the influence projection
navy.
4) On the Right Track? Pieces in Place to Develop the "Influence
Projection" Navy
Development of an "Influence Projection" model provides a different, and in
some ways more difficult, set of challenges for the PLAN than the "Unification" model.
China has some of the basic skills and assets in place to produce a "show-up" force that
could theoretically begin peacetime patrols beyond China's marginal seas. However, a
constrained budgetary environment and the technological incapacity of the Chinese
industrial base remain the greatest hurdles to development of the capabilities required to
expand the PLAN's capabilities beyond peacetime patrolling. Although Chinese naval
"hawks" and even PLAN officials publicly desire the type of navy that can deploy around
the globe to show the flag or defend China's interests, it might take as long as 30-50
years before the PLAN develops the core competencies required to fight a task force at
sea. Development of a light type aircraft carrier or amphibious assault ship would most
likely require significant
a) Growing Numbers of "Multi-Mission" Surface Combatants
Despite the PLAN's major weaknesses in ASW and AAW, the PLAN
continues to work toward improving each of these warfare areas. Each successive new
destroyer class that the PLAN has produced over the last fifteen years has had improved
AAW capabilities. China's ship design philosophy seems to encourage small numbers of
ships in each class in order to rapidly introduce new technology as it becomes available
to a succeeding class. Therefore, as new classes of ships are designed, and more
technologically advanced systems are developed or procured, each subsequent class
becomes more capable than the last. In this way, as the PLAN's newest ships are
introduced they will have the newest technologies and (presumably) the most capability.
In order to progress beyond the coastal confines of Mainland China, the PLAN
would need to continue to build and acquire larger, multi-mission ships for its surface
force. The purchase of four Sovremenny class destroyers from Russia provides a potent
anti-surface ship, but these ships do not provide the answer to the AAW and ASW
capability gap. The Sovremenny remain have little more than a self-defense AAW
capability and probably do not have an advanced ASW sensor suite (Jane 's 2007). They
remain vulnerable to attacks from the air and submarines, but the experience gained in
operating these larger ships during peacetime may prove useful to the PLAN. Larger
ships mean more room for systems, which means more probability that they will employ
advanced weapons and sensors to close the ASW and AAW capability gap. Also, the
trend of building larger surface ships also means that they can hold more fuel, which
makes long range cruising to areas outside of China's marginal seas or longer duration
patrols in them more feasible.
b) Development of an Underway Logistics Capability
Modem logistics forces are a pre-requisite to support deployments away
from existing base structures. Even within the marginal seas, the PLAN seems to
recognize the critical importance of logistics forces. The PLAN has completed
construction on one new fleet oiler (Type 866) and is reportedly building another. These
ships have demonstrated the ability to conduct refuel, rearming, and re-supplying PLAN
warships underway (UNREP), and significantly, have a hangar for a helicopter. 92
Vertical Replenishment (VERTREP) with helicopters is an important procedure to
quickly and efficiently re-supplying ships at sea and is a particular feature of carrier and
amphibious assault ship replenishment. Finally, when the PLAN sent a small surface
action group to the area around the Chunxiao Gas Fields in January 2005 consisting of
five ships, it was noticeable to that one of the ships was a Type 866 replenishment ship
(Fisher 2005). This inclusion might indicate that the PLAN surface action group was
operating at a range beyond what individual ships can comfortably operate or it could
indicate that the PLAN was testing operational concepts by deploying with a
replenishment ship and practicing replenishment operations. In either case, the PLAN's
has at least exhibited the awareness if the importance of an underway logistics capability
92 The People's Daily Online, "Naval Ships Practice Logistics Support," 25 June 2007.
C. MODEL III: THE GLOBAL SEA DENIAL PLAN
1) What is the Global Sea Denial Navy?
The Global Sea Denial navy would function to provide an asymmetric response
to a dominant naval power. This navy would not battle for sea control with a dominant
naval power, but would seek to weaken its opponent by forcing him to withdraw his
strengths from a contested battle space. In effect, this is a conventional regional
deterrence model designed to prevent a dominant naval power from operating against
China. Although this is a relatively extreme view of the potential development of the
PLAN, it is conceivable and worth paying attention to.
1) Global Sea
Denial against
great naval power.
(Anti-access on a
global or semi-
global scale.)
1) Defense against a
SLOC disruption
(distant blockade by
a great naval
power.)
2) Defense of
sovereignty;
increased coercion
against Taiwan.
1) Very quiet,
nuclear attack
submarines
(SSNs.)
2) Global, wide-
area surveillance
for targeting,
cueing.
3) Global or semi-
global C2
infrastructure
(comsats, imaging
sats)
1) Difficult to
acquire or develop
submarine
quieting
technology.
(China still
unproven in ability
to produce quiet
SSNs.)
2) Lack of C2
doctrine for
forward deployed
SSNs.
3) Might not be
politically
attractive to some
PLA leaders,
because it will
limit visible
impact (prestige)
of PLAN.
1) Nascent SSN
production
capability.
2) Large,
established(though
inexperienced)
submarine force.
Table 3: Characteristics of the "Global Sea Denial" Model
A large fleet (30-40) of advanced, ultra-quiet SSNs with advanced OTH weapons
would provide the primary force structure inputs for this model. In theory, this model
would try to force a similar cost-benefit recalculation for the dominant naval power
similar to the regional anti-access model, but would seek to accomplish this on a global
or hemispheric scale. In practice, this model is an indirect counter-force that enables
China to pre-empt any U.S. naval endeavors that challenge Chinese interests. In
particular, this model would address China's fear of a hypothetical "distant blockade" of
China's critical, distant SLOCs conducted by the United States. The very nature of this
asymmetrical approach requires stealth to avoid and counter U.S. naval strengths,
particularly America's most visible naval force projection capabilities (i.e. aircraft
carriers strike groups, expeditionary strike groups and integrated multi-mission surface
action groups.) Ironically, the attributes of this force that make it the most effective
counter-force against a dominant naval power (silence and invisibility) reduce its utility
in projecting Chinese power and influence away from its shores.
2) Chinese Interests Supported by the Global Sea Denial Navy?
a) Defense of China's Distant SLOCs Against Naval Powers
Because of China's increasing reliance upon the maritime highways for
trade and resources, disruptions could threaten the regime. China currently has the
military assets and experience to patrol and ensure a modicum of sea control throughout
its near SLOCs (those SLOCs in the South and East China Sea that fall under the air
umbrella of the PLAAF and the PLANAF). Any threat to the near SLOCs could be met
with significant Chinese force for an extended period of time. The PLAN would literally
be operating in its own backyard and could count on the support of the other branches of
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the PLA. As the distance increases from China, the challenge increases for the PLAN.
Critical SLOCs, such as the Strait of Malacca and the Sunda or Lombok Straits, are
barely within the range of the PLAN conventional submarines, and the Indian Ocean
seems hardly reachable. As the maritime component of the PLA, a global sea denial
navy would protect China's SLOCs by credibly denying their use to any other naval
power.
b) Increased Coercive Leverage Against Taiwan
The same justifications for increasing the military coercive lever against
Taiwan provided for the regional anti-access model applies to the Global Sea Denial
model. A navy capable of denying access on a global scale has considerable influence
over the decision-making calculus of the dominant power.
3) Primary Force Structure Requirements
a) Quiet Nuclear Attack Submarines
Should the PLAN acquire or develop significant numbers of quiet SSNs
with the acoustic signature equivalent of a Russian Akula class SSN or a contemporary
U.S. designed submarine, the United States will be forced respond with a significant
ASW response. By the end of the Cold War Soviet submarine designs had improved
significantly enough to seriously challenge the U.S. acoustical advantage. The increasing
stealth and dominance of the submarine in naval warfare so threatened the U.S. that some
predicted that the sea would be empty of ships and that fleets of ultra-quiet submarines
would patrol empty seas.93 Should the PLAN pursue this strategy, the U.S. would have
little answer.
93 For an outstanding unclassified account of the acoustic development of the Cold War submarine
confrontation between the Soviet and U.S. Navy, see (Cote 2003).
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Against surface ships, submarines generally have the advantage. By their nature,
submarines are a force multiplier. The mere threat that an enemy possesses submarines
forces an adversary to commit limited and often disproportionate, resources to search for
and locate them. 94 Submarine warfare and anti-submarine warfare requires not only vast
resources, but also a high state of readiness and training.
To attack a target, a submarine must search for and find its target, approach the
target within weapons' range, and then fire its weapon. Anti-Submarine warfare (ASW),
on the other hand, is designed to disrupt this process. When hunting submarines, the
search platform (ship, aircraft, or submarine) must search for, detect, classify, localize,
and then either track or attack the submarine. 95 Submarines use stealth (low acoustic
signature) and underwater endurance to defeat the ASW effort. Improvements in both
have been key enablers in advancing submarine design since World War II, allowing
submarines to maintain a significant advantage in the ASW cat and mouse game.
Initially, nuclear power provided the answer to increasing both stealth and
endurance for submarines. Nuclear powered submarines utilize a closed loop steam cycle
to provide propulsion both above and under water and do not need to surface to recharge
their batteries, as did older model diesels, greatly reducing the amount of time on the
surface and therefore reducing vulnerability. Also, because they do not use traditional
94 In one Cold War example, a submarine expert recalls that, "the entire Navy had to deploy in order to find
and maintain one submarine" (Maloney quoted in Cote 2003, 70). Similarly, during the Falkland Islands
War, the Royal Navy "expended nearly its entire ASW ordinance without sinking or disabling the two
modem Argentinean submarines that were in the area" (Goldstein and Murray 2004, 186).
95 ASW platforms search for submarines using acoustic (SONAR), magnetic anomaly (MAD), radio
(RADAR), electronic signal (ESM), infra-red (IR) plume, and visual detection methods. Sensors may be
located on mobile search platforms like ships, aircraft and satellites, or they may be fixed sensors (usually
placed on the sea-floor) that provide wide area surveillance. Once a target is detected it is called a datum,
and the ASW platform must next classify the datum. In order to classify the datum, the ASW platform
must determine whether it is in fact an enemy submarine, a friendly submarine, a decoy, or merely a false
detection. Next, ASW platforms attempt to localize the target, or place it within a specific area from which
the decision can be made to either track or attack the target.
102
diesel fuel, nuclear powered submarines have a virtually unlimited range. This freedom
allows nuclear submarines the ability to transit to their patrol stations completely
submerged and remain at sea for months at a time, an important advantage for a nation
that has interests far away from its shores. Nuclear submarines are, however,
extraordinarily expensive to build and require large amounts of maintenance and training
to operate safely. Also, the PLAN's current Han class nuclear submarines, developed in
the late 1960s and early 1970s are universally derided as loud and easily detectable,
making them not only ineffective against modem naval forces, but extremely vulnerable
to an efficient ASW force. 96
Submarine warfare has always been a deadly business with delicate and
complicated machines. On or near the surface, submarines are incredibly vulnerable to
detection and destruction. Therefore, they use their ability to hide under the ocean
surface, and strike with little or no warning, using powerful, and difficult to counter,
weapons. The submarine's primary weapon, the torpedo, packs the most powerful punch
of any conventional naval weapon system. ASW is a cat and mouse game where
combatants put a premium on detecting and engaging the enemy first. There has been a
constant battle to develop submarine launched weapons that can fire at an ASW platform
from outside of the ASW platforms detection range and outside of its weapon's release
range. The addition of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) to the submarine's arsenal has
increased its standoff range from a few thousand yards to nearly 100nm, with a resulting
increase in survivability and effectiveness for submarines.
96 The PLAN is currently producing the Type 093 SSN to replace the Han. Built with Russian engineering
assistance, this submarine is expected to incorporate many of the quieting technologies of Russian SSNs,
and its actual acoustic performance will be of great concern to the U.S. Navy when it commences sea trials.
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b) Global Command and Control and Wide-Area Surveillance
Again, the regional anti-access model provides most of the relevant
justifications and reasons as to why C2 and wide-area surveillance are important to navies
and necessary to enable effective targeting and cueing for naval assets. However,
relatively inexpensive specific technologies, such as OTH-B, that might effectively
provide a regional wide-area surveillance capability would not provide the same measure
of effectiveness on a global or even hemispheric scale. The Chinese will need to form an
integrated network of space and ground based sensors that would enable China to provide
that type of surveillance capability.
The U.S. Department of Defense believes that China is already developing several
spaced-based communication, navigation, and reconnaissance programs that might
contribute to the wide-area surveillance and targeting network. "China has accorded
space a high priority for investment...(and) is deploying advanced imagery,
reconnaissance, and Earth resource systems with military applications...In the next
decade, Beijing most likely will field radar, ocean surveillance, and high-resolution
photo-reconnaissance satellites" (CMP 2007, 20).
An over-reliance on a space-based approach, while "bolstering national prestige
and...demonstrating attributes of a world power," might leave China vulnerable to the
type of anti-satellite weapons that it recently demonstrated (CMP 2007, 20). Throughout
the Cold War, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. maintained surveillance facilities throughout the
world. Utilizing the Cold War alliance structure, the U.S. maintained these generally
highly secret facilities to provide persistent and low observable inputs into its C2
networks. The United States still maintains many of these ground stations that provide
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ELINT and SIGINT; some provide a redundant communications capability between the
national command authorities and deployed commanders. China might try to provide
redundant global surveillance and communication coverage throughout the developing
world by following the "pay for access" model used by many of China's its economic
concerns.
4) On the Right Track? Pieces in Place to Develop the "Global Sea
Denial" Navy
a) Nascent SSN and Large Conventional Submarine Force
In developing this model, the PLAN will not necessarily be starting from
scratch. The PLAN has operated SSN's for almost 35 years and conventional submarines
for over 50. However, the PLAN would face the dual challenges of developing and
manning an expanded SSN force. An experienced cadre of operating nuclear
submariners could provide the PLAN with the seed for an expanded force. Also, the
large number of conventional attack submarines already in service may ease a PLAN
attempt to develop a force structure based primarily on SSNs, by providing yet another
relatively large group of submariners that would already be trained in submarine
operations.
The Han class, the only SSN currently operating in the PLAN, is a 1960's design.
China's follow-on class (Type 093) SSN will replace the Han. This program may prove
critical to facilitating development of this force structure/maritime strategy model.
Although utilizing technological assistance from the Russians to build this latest SSN,
China already has an established conventional submarine capability. The Type 093
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program will provide even greater experience to Chinese shipyards that may allow serial
production of SSNs.
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VII. IMPLICATIONS
The force structures presented in this paper each provide a certain set of
capabilities that are optimized toward a certain strategy. Since the PRC is unlikely to
openly elaborate its strategic goals, recognizing and identifying force structure might help
identify China's maritime strategic direction. Once strategic goals are defined,
identifying the capabilities inherent in the recognized force structures may also assist in
measuring the limits of strategy. All three of the models presented contain a series of
trade offs and compromises that China must assess in order to choose a model that will fit
a strategy that best defends the PRC's maritime interests. This type of analysis might
then further inform policy analysis on how those trade offs affect China's strategic vision
and what that vision means to the United States and the region's security structure.
A. WHAT EACH MODEL MEANS
Each model presented in this paper increases current PLAN capabilities in support
of a specific set of interests. Unless stricken by an unforeseen economic or political
disaster, China's will continue to modernize the PLA. China's domestic politics and
civil-military relations make it a near certainty that continued PLAN modernization
efforts will contribute to coercive pressure on Taiwan. Beyond Taiwan, however, what is
China's envisioned role for the PLAN? The models presented here provide a point of
convergence that can provide an insight into China's strategic world view.
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A PLAN designed for anti-access or sea-denial provides the greatest challenges
for the United States. Whether to increase the PLA's overall coercive efforts in support
of unification or to limit U.S. ability to execute effective global sea control, either sea
denial forces structure will rely heavily on submarines. The secretive nature of the
"silent service" limits navy-to-navy interaction and increases the potential for
confrontational encounters. A PLAN structured on the regional anti-access model, might
imply that China sees the U.S. as a potential competitor in a regional crisis and desires an
option to limit that involvement. However, it might not necessarily assume a
confrontational posture with the U.S. on a global scale.
On the other hand, a global sea denial force structure invokes the "Hobbesian"
view to international relations mentioned by Ni, and may imply that China views the U.S.
as a direct strategic competitor and relations with the U.S. as a zero-sum game. Because
of the technological challenge in confronting a large number of quiet SSNs, this model is
the greatest threat to continued U.S. global maritime dominance. A global sea denial
force structured around a fleet of nearly undetectable nuclear submarines would alter the
global maritime balance, limiting the effects of U.S. naval presence when directly
opposed by the PLAN.
However, the "Global Sea Denial" strategy is fundamentally defensive in nature.
Although a potentially balance altering strategy, the "Global Sea Denial" navy may not
ultimately serve Chinese interests the best. As China sheds its continental outlook, it is
becoming a maritime nation. The assumption of this strategy is that a dominant naval
power may try to disrupt China's distant SLOCs. The U.S., as a nation reliant upon the
freedom of maritime commerce to transit the world's maritime highways is unlikely to
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attempt this strategy without significant provocation from China. This strategy may
prevent or deter the U.S. from blocking China's SLOCs, but it does not allow China to
actually exert positive control or influence over their SLOCs themselves. On the surface,
a model that does not leave China capable of actually exerting control of its SLOCs
should not seem attractive to China. However, even a perceived U.S. strategy of
containment might drive China to assume that the U.S. views itself as an inevitable
competitor in a zero-sum game. This model is a worse case strategy that does little to
promote the maritime security that China relies upon for continued economic and
political stability, and does not adequately assess fundamental U.S. vital interests.
Should China attempt to develop this model, it could seriously harm U.S.-China relations
and institute an increasingly expensive arms race as the U.S. develops counters to
China's
This model suggests the utility of increased Sino-American defense cooperation
in order to avoid strategic misinterpretation. It also suggests increasingly focusing U.S.
policy toward including China within regional security structures in order to encourage
China as an increasingly responsible stakeholder in maritime security. The U.S. should
continue to assure China of American commitment to ensure the freedom of navigation
and the maritime commerce around the globe. It also suggests that U.S. defense officials
should continue to develop potential counters to the quiet SSN threat, and maintain a
robust regional base structure to hedge against this strategy.
Conversely, an influence projection navy, might provoke the most wide-spread
concern among American foreign policy hawks, but would probably be the least likely to
upset the established maritime dominance of the U.S. The idea of a PLAN strike group
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patrolling the Indian Ocean is sure to rankle not only American navalists, but also Indian
and Japanese maritime power advocates. However, a PLAN structured around two or
three regularly patrolling strike groups is likely to confirm, rather than alter, American
maritime dominance. In order to do project influence, the navy represented by this model
needs to provide a visible presence around the world. By providing a visible presence,
the influence projection navy serves to reinforce one of the primary goals of U.S. naval
power: continued free access to the world's oceans.
The "influence projection" navy may prove attractive to China because it furthers
the PRC's perception of itself as a maritime nation and provides it with a force structure
that can begin to provide positive control of it interests abroad. Furthermore, the
"influence projection" navy may provide the potential for increased Chinese participation
in regional security initiatives and non-traditional security (e.g., disaster relief, anti-piracy
and anti-terrorism) and greatly increases the likelihood of positive navy-to-navy contacts
through positive exchange opportunities. Closer U.S. operational working relationships
with the PLAN may work to assure the Chinese of positive U.S. intentions and allow the
U.S. access to PLAN operational doctrine, techniques, and capabilities. This model
suggests that the U.S should not necessarily attempt to contain a PLAN that begins
steaming beyond traditional operating areas, but work to ensure a transparency in its
operations. In fact, it may even suggest that, should the policy maker assume that China
will continue with modernization efforts of the PLAN, the U.S. should encourage the
"influence projection" model in order to prevent Chinese investment in the "Global Sea
Denial" navy.
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B. GENERAL REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Regardless of the type of model, an improvement in capability and radius of
action for the PLAN will create tension in the region. Improved Chinese naval forces
represent a legitimate threat to peer powers, such as the Japanese, who have their own
economic and territorial interests to defend, but who possess limited long-rang power
projection resources from which to strike back. Although a more proficient and effective
PLAN provides Chinese policy makers with a powerful military and economic tool that
could be used to advance Chinese priorities in the region, it also fuels fears of Chinese
hegemonic intentions in the region.
Japan, for example, is completely reliant on the ocean for commerce and survival.
Constitutionally limited from "offensive" military forces, Japan has an interesting
dilemma when tasked with protecting its own SLOCs. Japan's naval forces, even in
home waters, might be vulnerable to a first strike from Chinese submarines or advanced
anti-access weapons, and have limited retaliatory options to carry the fight to the
Chinese, should China quickly withdrawal, and due to domestic Japanese political
concerns, preemptory options are off the table. This vulnerability has political and
military force structure implications for Japan that lead to questions concerning
deterrence. A modernizing PLAN may have the capability to operate and attack in
Japan's home waters, but the JMSDF is at a significant disadvantage if used in the China
Sea against a Chinese fleet protected by its own air force and operating close to its
defensive bastions. This may not be a tenable position for Japan as the PLAN
modernizes. Japan self-restraint in not utilizing preemption to ward off potential Chinese
attacks leaves it vulnerable. In order to limit the damage of a Chinese attack, or prevent
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it all together, Japan may decide to develop a more offensive force of its own to counter
the Chinese, or try to match Chinese force structure, creating a regional arms race. 97
9 Politically, the type of threats modeled here may give impetus for the Japanese to revisit the
constitutional definitions of offensive operations and a further redefining of offensive weapon systems, but
revisions of or changes to Japan's constitution would also generate apprehension and suspicions among
Japan's neighbors (not just China) that have further implications for the regional strategic balance.
Although outside of the scope of this paper, further discussion on development of a Japanese deterrence
model with respect to rising Chinese maritime power could provide value to the ongoing discussion on
Pacific security issues.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to identify how sea power theory, maritime interests,
constraints, and doctrine may indicate the direction of the PLAN's development. China
has, and continues to have, a somewhat confused approach to the modernization of its
navy. Regardless of increased defense spending, fiscal constraints and a reliance on
foreign sources for advanced technology will continue to limit military development. As
China's technology and weapon systems increase in quality, those systems will become
more and more expensive. The PRC will need to continually increase defense spending
to maintain a modicum of quantitative parity with regional powers like Japan and to
maintain the quantitative dominance required to credibly coerce Taiwan. Should China
continue its "scatter-gun" approach to PLAN modernization it risks increasing
irrelevance for China as a maritime power. Therefore, China must eventually develop a
coordinated approach to its naval development.
This paper presented the "Unification" model as the baseline for PLAN
modernization. Taiwan will continue to dominate Chinese policy, and one should assume
that any PLA modernization would focus its core efforts there. However, China does
have growing maritime interests that require attention. China is unlikely to abrogate
control of those maritime interests to the United States. Therefore, China will likely
continue to expand its maritime influence. Should China consider its maritime interests
generally secure under a Pax Americana, it will most likely develop a maritime strategy
less geared to confrontation. The "influence projection" navy seems most suited for the
types of maritime security operations (short of war) common today and will also serve to
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expand China's role as a regional naval power. However, should China view the U.S. as
a strategic competitor in a zero-sum game, it might develop a strategy of conventional
maritime deterrence. This "Global Sea Denial" model will contribute to greater maritime
instability by creating a potentially dangerous confrontational dynamic to the maritime
environment.
China has significant, legitimate, and growing economic interests. China also has
significant constraints and limitations to governmental military expenditures. Further
complicating matters, the regime views its position as precarious in the sense that it
China's maritime interests are critical not only to the economy and Chinese people, but
also to regime survival. As China's maritime interests have expanded, so has the
realization of the vulnerability created by a weak PLAN. Burgeoning Chinese maritime
interests and overseas trade may be tempting China's leadership to expand it military
influence beyond its borders and coastal areas. The challenge for Beijing will be to
develop a strategy that manages those interests as it modernizes the PLAN.
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